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Understanding the frictions that make it difficult for U.S. firms to conduct trade
with consumers and firms in foreign countries is the theme of this dissertation. It
is well known that U.S. firms interact with economic agents in other counties in-
frequently relative to their U.S. counterparts. This basic observation implies the
existence of significant barriers between national markets. Discerning how these fric-
tions shape the global flow of goods, business opportunities for U.S. firms, and the
welfare of foreign and U.S. consumers is at the heart of international economics.
The first essay focuses on uncovering the structure of export entry barriers faced
by U.S. firms. I look for evidence of complementaries in entry costs that would
generate increasing returns in the number of foreign destinations served. Perfect
complimentary, or a global sunk export entry cost, is one the firm must pay to access
any foreign market. Imperfect complimentarities might be geographic so that entering
Germany reduces the cost of entering France, or linguistic so exporting to Mexico
lowers barriers to entry into Spain. I discover that export status is hardly affected
by past experience exporting to other countries, even when those other countries are
similar to a potential export destination. In contrast, past experience exporting to
a particular country is very helpful to accessing that destination again. This implies
sunk entry barriers are mostly country specific.
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I also provide the first dollar value estimates of up-front costs that fully account
for the choice to access different markets and allow for a global entry cost. I find that
the global cost is $20 thousand while the cost to enter each country is $3.7 million
for Canada, $4.16 million for Japan, $3.58 million for Mexico, $4.22 million for the
United Kingdom, and $3.63 million for Germany. These results are consistent with
the descriptive statistics and reduced form results and again provide evidence that
entry costs are mainly country specific.
The second essay explores the rise of worldwide trade since 1987. In particular,
we look at the growth in the number of goods varieties traded internationally from
the perspective of the U.S. manufacturing firms. Using data from the U.S. Census,
we find that the percentage of plants that export rose from 21 percent in 1987 to
39 percent in 2006. In discussing the causes of similar documented trends in other
countries, prior authors have suggested the natural explanation that the up-front
costs of entering foreign markets has declined over time. We consider this hypothesis
and find little evidence that these trends have been driven by substantial declines in
entry costs. We instead make the case that increased participation was driven not
by a decline in the cost of entering foreign markets but by an increase in the benefits
of exporting. Specifically, the documented growth in foreign income over our time
period is sufficient to account for the rise in U.S. export participation.
The final essay explicitly considers the process by which producers and consumers
find one another. It embeds search and matching frictions in a general equilibrium
international trade model with heterogeneous firms. The search friction at the heart
of the model arises because it takes time and expense for U.S. importers to find
suitable foreign varieties. Search implies that the price paid for an imported good
lies between the domestic final sales price and the foreign affiliate’s average cost of
production. Largely due to profit maximizing conditions that survive the addition
of search, many of the standard trade results remain intact. In particular, search
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frictions do not affect the quantity traded, the productivity threshold necessary to
export or the domestic price. Nevertheless, the search friction enters the standard
gravity equation, and the total value of imports falls as search frictions rise with the
magnitude of the search friction having a first order effect on the value of imports.
We argue ignoring these frictions will lead to biased estimates of the effect of variable




The Structure of Export Entry Costs
2.1 Introduction
Sunk export entry costs are a fundamental determinant of whether firms export; a
fact which has been highlighted by modern firm level models of international trade in
the style of Melitz (2003). Despite the important role sunk costs play, we understand
little about their structure. In particular, we do not know if entry costs are country
specific, global or something in between. A global sunk export entry cost is one
the firm must pay to access any foreign market. An example of this is finding a
transport company that ships to any location. Country specific sunk costs could
be paid in addition to this cost in order to access a specific foreign market. These
might include satisfying product safety requirements or establishing a distribution
network at a national level. The true structure of entry costs could be something
between purely global or country specific. In this case, entry costs could exhibit
significant complementarities among destinations. Examples might be geographic so
that entering Germany reduces the cost of entering France, or linguistic so exporting
to Mexico lowers barriers to entry into Spain.
This paper makes two main contributions to understanding sunk export entry
costs. First, it seeks to understand destination complementarity for firms’ entry
decisions and finds that entry costs are mostly country specific. Descriptive statistics
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show that U.S. firms only enter one destination when they start exporting and as
such do not appear to be benefiting from returns to scale with regard to the number
of destinations served. Reduced form results show export status exhibits tremendous
country specific conditional persistence and is hardly affected by past experience
exporting to other countries. In particular, if a firm exports to country c last year,
the probability it exports to c this year increases by 26.19 percentage points. If they
export to one location other than c, the probability they export to c this year increases
by only 0.73 percentage points.
The second main contribution of the paper is to provide dollar value estimates of
the up-front costs firms face when entering major U.S. export destinations. To my
knowledge this is the only paper that provides estimates that fully account for the
choice to access different markets and allow for a global entry cost. Using the Metal
Forgings and Stampings (SIC 346) industry and the top 5 U.S. export destinations, I
find that the global cost is $20 thousand while the costs to enter each country are $3.7
million for Canada, $4.16 million for Japan, $3.58 million for Mexico, $4.22 million
for the United Kingdom, and $3.63 million for Germany. These results are consistent
with the descriptive statistics and reduced form results and again provide evidence
that entry costs are mainly country specific.
This paper also provides an important empirical test of the country specific entry
cost assumption currently made by most heterogeneous trade models. Some standard
results from these models rely on the assumption of country specific export entry costs.
For example, in Melitz-style models, and Broda and Weinstein (2006) in particular,
larger markets have higher welfare because they have access to more varieties. This
result, however, is driven by the assumption of country specific sunk entry costs. If
the sunk export entry costs is incurred in getting goods out of the domestic country
instead of getting them into a foreign market, then the number of imported varieties is
uncorrelated with market size. While purely global entry costs are the extreme case,
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any entry cost complementarities work towards separating the relationship between
importer market size and welfare.
Additional motivation comes from Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) who showed
that accounting for multilateral resistance dramatically attenuates estimates of the
trade retarding effect of national borders. To date, however, analogous relationships
along the participation margin of trade have received little attention. Large comple-
mentarities in entry costs could change the nature of firm participation in trade by
introducing “hub” participation countries that share similarities to other potential
destinations. These hubs would attract more varieties, and have higher welfare, than
predicted by trade models that do not allow for complementarities in entry costs.
Any complementarities will also link the firm participation decision across export
destinations. For example, if a European Union entry cost is large relative to country
specific entry costs for the countries in the EU, then changes to market size, vari-
able trade costs, and other country specific factors that increase the profitability of
exporting to Germany will also raise the probability firms export to France. This
simple mechanism links export participation across destinations in a novel and com-
plex way. The existence of these linkages would have important policy implications
since a reduction of bilateral tariffs will make a country more attractive but could
also induce entry into other countries that share similar entry barriers.
It should be noted that throughout this paper I do not take a stand on the funda-
mental determinant of these sunk entry costs. In this respect, my paper differs from
those that seek to introduce micro founded sources of sunk costs based on learning as
in Ruhl and Willis (2009) and Eaton, Eslava, Krizan, Kugler and Tybout (2012), or
search as in Chaney (2011), or reaching additional consumers as in Arkolakis (2010).
With that said, the fact that I find entry costs to be mainly country specific and of
similar magnitudes across destinations, is generally consistent with interpreting them
as being mainly due to market penetration. This reinforces a report by the consulting
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firm First Washington Associates (1991) conducted for the World Bank which argues
that the majority of foreign market entry cost is related to marketing. It also matches
more closely the theoretical framework and results of Arkolakis (2010).
Nearly all canonical heterogeneous firm trade models assume entry costs are purely
country specific as in Melitz (2003), Chaney (2008) and Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz
(2011). Recently, three papers have shown that this assumption is suspect and argue
there are significant complementarities among export participation decisions for dif-
ferent destinations. In particular, Hanson and Xiang (2011) consider two versions of
the Melitz model. One version is standard and has only country specific entry costs.
The second has both bilateral and global costs. The two versions lead to estimation
equations that make opposing predictions about the sign of the coefficient on variable
trade costs. They estimate these coefficients using U.S. movie sales and reject the
model of only country specific sunk costs in favor of the model that includes global
and country specific costs.
Allowing for a more nuanced relationship between destinations Morales, Sheu and
Zahler (2011) study sunk costs for one Chilean chemicals industry 1995-2005 using
a moment inequality approach. The authors find sunk export entry costs contain
“gravity” and “extended gravity” components. The gravity component is such that
Chilean firms find it less expensive to start exporting to countries that are more
similar to Chile. The “extended gravity” component means Chilean firms find it less
expensive to start exporting to countries that are more similar to countries the firm
has exported to in the past. Their model also includes a basic cost that firms pay if
they have no exporting experience. This basic cost is estimated to be approximately
70,000 year 2000 U.S. dollars. Overall their paper finds evidence that there is a global
entry cost and significant complementarities to the up-front cost of exporting.
Using a panel of Norwegian manufacturers, Moxnes (2010) argues that both bi-
lateral and global costs exist and that country specific costs are three times as large
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as global. The reduced form model includes two equations and does not provide
estimates of entry costs but only of the persistence they introduce. One equation
describes the decision to export to a specific country and the second equation cap-
tures the decision to export at all. A normally distributed firm-destination effect
helps control for unobserved heterogeneity in this random effects framework. Joint
estimation of the two choices is accomplished via dynamic mixed logit/probit models
for panel data following Train (2003).
My results are largely consistent with Moxnes (2010) but stand in contrast to
Morales, Sheu and Zhaler (2011) and Hanson and Xiang (2011). There are likely two
explanations for this. First, like this paper, Moxnes (2010) relies on all Norwegian
manufacturing sectors, whereas Morales, Sheu and Zhaler (2011) and Hanson and
Xiang (2011) focus on individual industries, specifically a Chilean chemicals industry
and U.S. movie producers, respectively. These specific industries may exhibit entry
costs complementarities while most sectors do not. Second, as will be discussed in
more detail in the reduced form section, identification of sunk costs relies on careful
identification of state dependence which can be conflated with heterogeneity. Moxnes
(2010) controls for unobserved heterogeneity while Morales, Sheu and Zhaler (2011)
do not.
Lastly, Lincoln and McCallum (2012) use the two country model and Bayesian
estimation strategy developed by Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007) to estimate entry
costs that range from $2 million to $5.5 million year 1987 USD for four U.S. man-
ufacturing industries. I estimate my model on the exact data used by Lincoln and
McCallum (2012) for the 1992-2003 panel of the Metal Forgings and Stampings (SIC
346) industry. While their model and estimation method differ dramatically from the
one presented here, my results are remarkably similar.
The next section presents stylized facts that shed light on the basic nature of up-
front costs facing U.S. firms. Section three presents a dynamic panel linear probability
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model that utilizes all of the data. We learn about entry cost from this model because
if there is a large global entry cost, then exporting somewhere in the past will raise the
probability of exporting anywhere else in the present. Similarly, if there are significant
complementarities among export destinations, exporting somewhere in the past will
raise the probability of exporting to a similar country in the present. The results
in both specifications imply entry costs are mainly country specific. Section four
details the structural model which provides dollar value estimates of entry costs. In
the model, each firm chooses the set of destinations to serve each period given the
set of destinations they served last period. Firms are forward-looking and form a
forecast of the expected profit stream they expect to earn based on a measure of their
productivity and market demand. They then choose to pay the sunk entry cost if
the discounted value of profits minus the sunk entry cost will result in positive net
profit. I employ recent econometric advances discussed in Su and Judd (2012) in the
estimation of the structural parameters of this dynamic discrete choice (DDC) model.
Section five summarizes the results of the structural model showing again that entry
costs are mostly country specific. Finally, the last section presents conclusions and
avenues for further research.
2.2 Data and stylized facts
The data are from the Center of Economics Studies at the U.S. Census. The
primary data sets are the Longitudinal Foreign Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD)
which I match to the Business Registry (BR). The LFTTD provides the universe of
U.S. firm export transactions 1992-2007 and the BR provides firm characteristics such
as total employment, total wage bill and primary industry, among others. I observe
about 40,000 U.S. manufacturing firms’ exporting behavior to the top 50 export
destinations over 16 years. I restrict the sample to firms with 20 or more employees
and utilize only arms length export revenue. All export revenues are converted to
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2000 USD using sector level producer price indexes from the NBER productivity
database. Table 2.1 includes the top 50 countries along with the average number of
U.S. firms exporting to each and average value of exports per firm over 1992-2007.
Throughout the paper I will define foreign market entry as a U.S. firm exporting
a positive amount to a given country. Recent work by Bernard, Redding and Schott
(2010) and Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011) highlight the importance of the prod-
uct participation margin in addition to the firm participation margin. I abstract from
the product dimension throughout this paper for two reasons. First, over longer time
horizons, which will be the focus of this paper, the product space itself is endogenous
since firms can choose to invent or abandon products. Likewise, natural attrition and
uptake using any classification of products obscures the definition of export entry and
exit at the product level. The second reason is that including products would increase
firms’ state space and quickly make my model intractable. As such, I focus on entry
at the country-firm-year level and assume the set of countries a firm can choose to
serve is exogenous.
A few descriptive statistics quickly shed light on the structure of export entry
costs. If there is one global cost or significant complementarities in entry costs, then
entry behavior benefits from returns to scale in the number of destinations entered.
Table 2.2 shows that firms start exporting to only one market regardless of firm
size. Furthermore, firms do not dramatically increase the number of foreign markets
served after their first exporting experience. This is true across all employment size
categories looking up to five years after a firm’s initial entry into international markets.
These numerical results are robust to a number of alternative definitions of foreign
market entry and are remarkably similar when Canada is not considered a foreign
market. Foreign market entry here is defined as exporting in the present year after
not exporting for any of the past three years. Defining entry as exporting in the
present year after having not exported in the past two years or not exporting in the
11
past year also gives the same result.
Table 2.3 presents a similar message; firms only enter a few destinations when they
start exporting. In fact, 99.1% of firms enter three or fewer destinations. Bernard,
Jensen and Schott (2009) have a similar result using the cross section to report the
number of destinations served by all exporters in 1993 and 2000. They do not restrict
to new entrants as I do here and as such report a higher fraction of firms serving
more destinations. Their higher fraction is likely driven by the fact that exporting
firms are typically larger than new entrants and that these larger firms serve more
destinations. Like Table 2.2, the results of Table 2.3 do not depend on length of
export history used to define entry or if Canada is treated as a foreign market.
Looking at the destinations where firms begin exporting shows they are the same
destinations that receive the most U.S. export volume. For example, firms start
exporting to Canada, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Australia, Hong
Kong, Singapore, China, Italy, France, The Netherlands, Ireland, Taiwan and South
Korea. These entry destinations do not exhibit a striking pattern beyond what a
standard gravity equation would suggest. In other words, there do not seem to be
strong complementarities among the unconditional choice of entry destination.
Table 2.4 presents basic statistics regarding the first year of exporting. The vast
majority of new exporters have fewer than 150 employees and have typical first year
sales between $60,000 and $95,000 year 2000 USD per country served. These measures
will be helpful for interpreting the entry cost estimates provided by the structural
model.
Figure 2.1 provides more evidence that the main entry barriers firms face are
country specific. As the value of exporting to a specific destination c increases, the
probability that a firm exports there also increases. This relationship is evident in
the data when using employment to proxy for the value of exporting. Furthermore,
conditioning on firms exporting experience should shift this schedule up or down
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depending on the structure of entry barriers. As can be seen, the probability of
exporting to a given destination is essentially unchanged for firms that have experience
exporting to at least one other country and those that have no exporting experience.
This stands in contrast to the dramatic increase in the fraction of firms that export
to a specific country conditional on having exported there last year. The fact that
country specific experience raises the probability of exporting to that country while
general exporting experience does not suggests the magnitude of country specific entry
costs is much larger than any global cost that might exist.
Understanding the determinants of the number of firms that export to a particular
market, of which entry costs are certainly one, is important if we want to know why
the U.S. exports a lot to some countries and not much to others. This fact has been
known since Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) pointed out that the variation in
the number of firms that export to different markets explains a large portion of the
variation in total export flows. Figure 2.2 graphs the contributions of the log number
of firms and log average exports to the total variance in U.S. exports across destination
markets in each year 1992-2007. Firm participation contributes more than average
exports in each year 1992-2007 and averages 41% of the total variance in export
flows over that period. Removing Canada, or both Canada and Mexico, leaves each
component with one third of the total variance. Summing both contributions does
not add to 100 percent since the remaining portion in each year is from the covariance
between the number of firms and average exports per firm.
2.3 Reduced form
This section presents a preliminary view of the geographic structure of entry costs
using a reduced form model. The logic behind the specification comes from the sem-
inal work of Dixit (1989) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989) and similar models have
been employed to study export entry costs by Roberts and Tybout (1997), Bernard
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and Wagner (2001), Bernard and Jensen (2004) and Lincoln and McCallum (2012),
among others. I use it because existence of country specific sunk entry costs will
induce persistence in a firm’s export status to that country. Additionally, existence
of a global sunk entry cost implies that the probability of serving any destination
increases if the firm has prior experience exporting anywhere else. Likewise, com-
ponents of entry cost that depend on similarities between countries would lead prior
exporting experience to a destination that shares some characteristic, for example,
legal origin or common border, to increase the probability of exporting to a similar
destination. The specification here has a few advantages. First, its simple linear
structure allows consideration of 50 countries and all U.S. firms. Second, it exploits
the panel structure of the data to control for unobserved heterogeneity which can
confound identification of state dependence induced by entry costs. And third, it
provides a way to check the basic framework and assumptions of the structural model
put forward in the next section.
2.3.1 State dependence vs. heterogeneity
To explain how sunk export entry costs map to persistence, consider the following
basic process
ycit = ρycit−1 + εcit (2.1)
where ycit = {0, 1} denotes if firm i exports to country c in year t and εcit is i.i.d. mean
zero with a finite second moment. This example abstracts from any other covariates
that might cause a firm to export in order to explain the link between sunk costs and
persistence as clearly as possible. Absent estimation issues, the persistence coefficient
in the regression is P [ycit = 1 | ycit−1 = 1]−P [ycit = 1 | ycit−1 = 0] = ρ. Hence, if the
firm exported last period, the probability it exports this period increases by ρ. Each
probability that comprises persistence has a straightforward linkage to sunk costs.
The term P [ycit = 1 | ycit−1 = 1] is the probability that a firm continues to serve a
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destination. Higher sunk entry cost will increase the real option value of remaining an
exporter despite temporary shocks to εcit and in turn increase this probability. The
second term, P [ycit = 1 | ycit−1 = 0] is the probability of entry which is decreasing in
the magnitude of the sunk entry cost. Therefore, greater persistence implies higher
sunk entry costs and vise versa. If there are any sunk costs so that ρ > 0, the state of
exporting last period raises the probability of exporting this period and the process
exhibits state dependence.
One of the seminal papers to study sunk export entry costs, Roberts and Tybout
(1997), highlights the fact that identifying export entry costs requires separating per-
sistence generated by sunk entry costs from any other sources of persistence in export-
ing status. The fact that state dependence can be conflated with heterogeneity has
been well known since Heckman (1981) and Chamberlain (1985). Estimated persis-
tence may be due to “true” state dependence or due to either observed or unobserved
heterogeneity. In particular, time invariant error components and persistent errors
are two important types of unobserved heterogeneity. Persistence due to permanent
heterogeneity simply reflects underlying differences in firms and their propensity to
export to a given destination. Such “spurious” state dependence would lead to incor-
rect conclusions about the nature of sunk export entry costs and must therefore be
carefully controlled for in any empirical specification.
The importance of firms’ lasting differences has received considerable attention fol-
lowing Melitz (2003). That trading and non-trading firms differ has been documented
many times and a good survey is provided by Redding and Melitz (forthcoming).
However, trading firms also differ from other trading firms. Bernard, Jensen, Red-
ding and Schott (2010) document substantial heterogeneity among trading firms that
contributes to deviations from standard gravity model predictions. In short, there
is significant heterogeneity among firms that needs to be properly conditioned out
of any regression that seeks to identify state dependence. Including observable firm
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and destination specific variables will be important but inevitably some unobserved
heterogeneity will remain. For example, we have little hope of observing variables
that measure managerial ability, product quality or foreign consumers’ affinity to-
wards an American brand. As such, both in the reduced form and structural models,
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity will be a prerequisite for identifying entry
costs.
2.3.2 Specification










λhXcit−h + δt + δci + εcit (2.2)
where i , c, and t index firms, countries, and years respectively. The dependent
binary variable ycit = {0, 1} is on if firm i exports to country c in year t and off
otherwise. The coefficients on the lagged country specific export variables, βh, are
the marginal increase in the probability of exporting to a country this year if the
firm exported there last year. The variable, nit−h ≡
∑
k 6=c ykit−h, is the number of
other destinations, not including the dependent variable destination, to which the
firm exported in period t−h. The relative magnitude of coefficients β and γ captures
the relative importance of the country specific (bilateral) and global entry costs. The
controls in Xcit−h include both firm specific and country specific variables. Among
the firm specific variables, Xit−h, are the log of the average real wage (to proxy for
labor productivity) and the log of the number of employees (which proxies for other
sources of productivity). The foreign market specific covariates, Xct−h, include the
log of average real exports per firm to that market (to control for foreign market
size, tariffs faced by U.S. exporters, and transport costs), the log of the number of
U.S. manufacturing firms that export to that market (to control for general market
attractiveness and potential network effects) and the log of the real exchange rate
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defined so an increase corresponds to a depreciation of the foreign currency relative
to the U.S. dollar.
The baseline specification above allows comparison of the country specific and
global sunk entry cost but extensions are readily available. In particular, testing the


















λhXcit−h + δt + δci + εcit (2.3)
where nleglit−h and n
ctig
it−h are the number of countries, other than the dependent vari-
able country, to which the firm exports in period t − h that share common legal
origin or a contiguous border with country c. For brevity I use only legal origin and
contiguous border as examples here but the regression results in Table 2.6 include
common colonial relationship, contiguous border, common currency, similar distance
from the U.S., common language, common legal origin, similar per capita GDP, com-
mon region, and common memberships in regional trade agreements.
Identification of the country specific or other components of entry costs is achieved
by exploiting the dynamic panel structure of the model. Shocks to Xcit−h will change
the value of exporting to specific locations and therefore induce changes in export
status to that country, ycit−h, and the number of other destinations, nit−h, as well.
The variation in ycit−h and nit−h then allows identification of their respective coef-
ficients and the nature of entry costs. Hence, shocks to Xcit−h induce variation in
the lagged dependent variables where the magnitude of these relative responses then
allows distinguishing between types of entry costs.
Finally, since this is a paper about firm participation, often called the extensive
margin of trade, the work of Armenter and Koren (2012) will be particularly useful
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in considering what I can hope to learn from the micro data. Their main point is to
carefully choose the null hypothesis for any moment calculated in the data. Sparsity
makes it difficult to distinguish zeros that occur in the data at random from zeros
generated by structural features. Their “Balls-and-Bins” model of trade, however,
provides a guide for which moments can be used to identify structural models of
trade. They suggest the fraction of firms that export is a particularly useful moment.
The expected value of the dependent variable in my specification is precisely the
fraction of firms that export to country c in year t and likewise should be informative
according to their reasoning.
2.3.3 Estimation issues
As outlined above, the way I learn about sunk entry costs is by carefully decom-
posing country specific state dependence from other sources of export status state
dependence. I need to use a dynamic model to identify state dependence but omit-
ting unobserved heterogeneity will lead to upwards biased estimates of the persistence
coefficients. Intuition for this upwards bias in the present context can be developed
by considering the possibility that some firms are “good” at exporting and some are
“bad” at exporting. Firms that are “good” at exporting will likely always export and
firms that are “bad” will likely export less often. In this way, the “good” and “bad”
heterogeneity will cause observed export status to appear more persistent than if it
is properly conditioned out. In particular, if there is any unobservable heterogeneity
simple OLS will lead to an over estimate of persistence.
I can exploit the panel structure of the data and use fixed effects to control for
unobserved heterogeneity. However, well known work on dynamic panel estimation
where unobserved individual heterogeneity is removed by first differences (FD) was
shown by Nickell (1981) to give persistence estimates that are biased downwards
when the true coefficient is positive. The explicit functional form of the bias using
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the within-group (WG) transformation and WG with time dummies are provided
by Hahn and Kursteiner (2002) and Hahn and Moon (2006), respectively. These
two papers show that WG (with or without time effects), like FD, is asymptotically
biased if the ratio N/T goes to a constant even as N and T individually go to infinity.
For fixed N , the asymptotic bias is order O (T−1) in each of these papers. As such,
without the constraint on the ratio of N/T the asymptotic bias eventually disappears.
The asymptotic bias is also a function of the error variance-covariance matrix so the
absolute size of the bias depends on an unobserved quantity. Using Monte Carlo
experiments, Arellano (2003) argues that if the number of periods is at least 10 then
the downward bias caused by the within-group estimator is likely small.
In summary, OLS will provide an over estimate of the importance of country
specific exporting experience, and within-group estimation that includes fixed effects
will provide an underestimate. In order to consistently estimate the parameters for
fixed T I employ the unbiased GMM based estimator developed by Arellano and
Bond (1991). The assumptions of this estimation technique are valid in the linear
probability model context despite the assured heteroskedasticity of the model. As
a reminder, linear probabilities models are assured to be heteroskedastic since the
estimated errors can only take two values. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level and I rely on at least 1.5 million cross section firm-country observations to
deal with any remaining heteroskedasticity. Using weak instruments or specifying
a large number of moment restrictions relative to the cross section sample size has
been shown to lead to considerable finite sample bias in Monte Carlo studies of the
dynamic panel GMM estimators. Among others, see Arellano and Bond (1991), Kiviet
(1995), Ziliak (1997), Blundell and Bond (1998) for details. The large number of cross
section observations relative the number of moments I employ reduce any worries on
this score.
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2.3.4 Reduce form results
The baseline results presented in Table 2.5 suggest that sunk export entry costs
are largely country specific. The first column presents the OLS based estimates that
do not control for unobserved heterogeneity and will overestimate the importance
of country specific sunk costs. The second column presents the consistent Arellano
and Bond (1991) estimation results where firm-country and time fixed effects are
included. The third column presents within-group estimation that allows firm-country
and time fixed effects and will underestimate the importance of country specific sunk
entry costs. In short, columns one and three present upper and lower bounds of
the country specific effects and column two presents a consistent estimate. Finally,
column four includes all possible interacted fixed effects; firm-time, country-firm, and
country-time using the within-group estimator. The fact that columns three and four
give similar estimates of country specific persistence suggests the controls in columns
two and three do a good job of controlling for heterogeneity.
Since the model is an LPM, the coefficients are interpreted as marginal changes
in probability. Considering the second column and holding all else constant, if a firm
exported to country c last year, the probability it exports to c this year increases by
26.19 percentage points. If they export to one location other than c, the probability
they export to c this year increases by 0.73 percentage points. The export status
process exhibits tremendous country specific conditional persistence and is hardly
affected by exporting to other countries. Even if a firm exported to 10 other locations
last year, the probability they export to country c increases by only 7.3 percentage
points which is less than the effect of exporting to country c two years ago. These
results are remarkably similar across estimation techniques denoted by each column.
The number of other countries served in the past is collinear with the interacted fixed
effects included in column four and is therefore omitted.
While Table 2.5 results are consistent with the definition of a global sunk entry
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cost, the true nature of entry costs may be determined by similarities between coun-
tries instead of exporting experience to any destination. As such, Table 2.6 includes
the second specification. This regression allows for many different sources of comple-
mentarities but the message is the same as the baseline regression. Looking again at
the second column and holding all else constant, if a firm exports to c last year, the
probability they export to c this period increases by 26.08 percentage points. If last
year they exported to one location other than c that at some time in the past had
a colonial relationship with c, the probability they export to c this year increases by
1.64 percentage points. This is the largest complimentary effect that can be seen in
Table 2.6 and is likely due to the historical colonial relationship between the United
Kingdom and Canada which are both common export destinations for U.S. firms.
The marginal effect of each of the complementarities is small relative to the country
specific effect. Even if a country c shares many similarities with a destination, the sum
of the effects will be small relative to country specific exporting experience. Again,
these results are not sensitive to the estimation methodology presented in each of the
columns.
As mentioned in the introduction, I do not take a stand on the fundamental source
of these sunk entry costs. With this agnosticism in mind the specifications above
includes three lags on all variables. The coefficients on these lags can be interpreted
as demand accumulation, learning, market penetration or decay in a true sunk entry
cost. They can also account for the well documented increased survival rate of firms
that remain in a market. For example, the baseline results of Table 2.5 column two
implies that a firm that has three continuous years of exporting experience to a market
will have a 26.19 + 9.10 + 3.16 = 38.45 percentage point increase in the probability
they export to that market this year. In contrast, one year of export experience only
raises the probability by 26.19 percentage points. My results suggest any meaningful
effect of demand accumulation, learning or decay in entry costs is largely experienced
21
in the first year and completely realized after three years.
I present a few robustness checks for these baseline specifications. In particular, I
use an indicator variable that is on if the firm exported elsewhere in the past instead
of using the number of other destinations. I do this for both the regression that tests
for global entry costs and the one with gravity similarities. I also change the sample
for both specifications. The baseline sample follows the literature, and Roberts and
Tybout (1997) in particular, in allowing for firms to enter production but not to
exit. This ensures any exit from exporting is a true exit from exporting and not a
firm shutting down. To check that this assumption is not driving the results I also
estimate the model on a balanced panel and a panel that allows for firm birth and firm
death and get the same results. Finally, much of the international trade literature
makes a significant distinction between the behavior of firms of different sizes. To
check this, I restrict the firms in the sample by firm size categories and still find that
the magnitude of the country specific experience is much larger than other sources of
persistence.
2.4 Dynamic structural model
This section presents a structural model of the decision firms make to enter foreign
markets. Firms are forward looking and have pricing power once they enter a foreign
market. Each period they consider all possible combinations of destinations they could
serve and choose the set that maximizes value. The model is partial equilibrium in
that firms’ choices do not have an effect on the macroeconomic environment but the
structure I employ allows each sector to be nested in a familiar general equilibrium
model in the spirit of Melitz (2003). I also abstract from strategic behavior among
firms.
Intuitively, firms solve the entry decision using backwards induction. First they
decide what price to charge if they export to a country, then given this behavior they
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form an estimate of the future profit stream of serving each market and enter the set of
markets that will result in positive profits net of any entry costs. The operating profit
generated by each firm is a simple function of expected revenue. Expected revenue,
however, cannot be calculated simply using observed revenue in each market because
revenue is only observed when the firm exports to that market. This commonly seen
problem is often referred to as Heckman selection after Heckman (1979) but is also
known as a type II probit model. I resolve this problem by jointly estimating the
determinants of revenue and export participation.
2.4.1 Optimal static pricing decision (intensive margin)
There are C countries indexed by c, and S + 1 sectors indexed by s. The repre-










where qsct is consumption of differentiated goods sector s in country c in calendar
year t. q0ct is consumption of a freely traded homogeneous good that will serve as
the numeraire. It is produced under constant returns to scale with one unit of labor.
The exponent µsct can be interpreted as a country and sector specific demand shock
that varies by year. Since the utility function is Cobb-Douglas, the expenditure on
goods from sector s is Y sct = µ
s
ctYct where Yct is aggregate expenditure in country c.
Each sector is an aggregate of Ωsct varieties, one produced by each firm i. The














where each firm faces a demand shock ωcit to it’s own variety. Firms are monop-
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olistically competitive so they set prices equal to a markup times the marginal cost










ct ≥ 1 is a sector specific iceberg cost, cst is the
cost of an input bundle and ait is a firm’s efficiency. The c
s
t input bundle can include
any input costs as long as the firm can flexibly adjust that input within the period
and as long as the production function is constant returns to scale. Including this










From here on suppress the sector superscript and subscript s since I will estimate
the structural model sector-by-sector. Taking the log of (2.7) gives






I will not observe all the variables in this expression and I need to keep the state
space parsimonious so I parametrize log revenue as
rcit = αc + βcwit + γcxt + ηcit (2.9)
where wit is the log number of full-time employees at firm i in year t and xt is
the log of U.S. manufacturing exports. Notice that each term has a straightforward
mapping to the constant, marginal cost, and market size and tariff measures in the






revenue is distributed according to
f (rcit | wit, xt) = σ−1cη φ
(




where φ (·) denotes the standard normal probability density function. The i.i.d.
assumption implies that, while firms know their specific distribution of revenue in
a market, they do not know their revenue realization until after making the entry
decision. I assume firms make their decision to enter the market using the properties
of the log normal distribution to calculate expected revenue
E [Rcit | wit, xt] = exp
(






Before accounting for sunk entry cost, define gross operating profits as
πgcit = ε
−1
c E [Rcit | wit, xt]− fc (2.12)
This expression for gross profit nests the standard result for monopolistic com-
petition and CES demand when there is no uncertainty and no period fixed costs
(i.e. σ2cη = 0, fc = 0). Export revenue cannot be negative in the model, which is
consistent with monopolistic competition, but gross operating profits may be. Also,
uncertainty in the level of revenue will unambiguously increase expected revenue but
will not guarantee positive gross operating profits.
2.4.2 Dynamic destination choice (extensive margin)
I characterize the entry decision of the firm taking optimal pricing behavior once
they enter as determined by the assumptions in the previous section. As such, pe-
riod net profit takes the sum of gross operating profit across countries and subtracts
country specific and global entry cost
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ε−1c E [Rcit | wit, xt]− fc
)
ycit − b · eit − g · egit + εit (yit)
(2.13)
where yit is a C×1 vector of indicator variables. Each element of this vector defines
the binary exporting status of firm i in year t to a particular country c. For example, if
I restricted the set of countries under consideration to Canada and Mexico, the status
vector would be yit = (yCANit, yMEXit)
′ and exporting to only Canada would make
the vector (yCANit, yMEXit)
′ = (1, 0)′. Notice that if yit is a vector of zeros, the firm
only serves the U.S. market. I do not allow firms to enter or exit production entirely
since they must at least always serve the U.S. market. Country specific export entry
costs b are also in a 1×C vector. Entry is captured by the vector of entry indicators
eit = eit (yit,yit−1) which is C × 1 and has the same structure as yit. Each element
of eit is an indicator where firm i entered market c in year t if current export status
ycit = 1 but last year’s export status was ycit−1 = 0. The parameter g is the scalar
global entry cost if the firm did not serve any foreign market last period but exports
today. The scalar egit = e
g
it (yit,yit−1) is a scalar indicator equal to one if the firm
exports somewhere this year and did not serve any foreign destination last period.
There is one scalar structural error draw εit = εit (yit) for each combination of yit
destinations. This is an unobserved error for the econometrician but an observed state
variable for the firm. Given their current state (yit−1, wit, xt, εit), the firm chooses the
current and future set of countries that maximizes the expected present discounted
value of future period profits where the expectation is taken over the future evolution
of states and δ is the discount rate. I will assume that all stochastic states have
Markov transition densities so the value function can be written using Bellman’s
equation
V (yit−1, wit, xt, εit) = max
yit
{π (yit,yit−1, wit, xt) + εit (yit) + δE [V (yit, wit+1, xt+1, εit+1)]}
(2.14)
where the expectation E [·] is against the joint transition density denoted by
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p (wit+1, xt+1, εit+1 | yit−1, wit, xt, εit) = px (xt+1 | xt) pw (wit+1 | wit) pε (εit+1 | yit)
(2.15)
Here I have assumed (xt+1, wit+1, εit+1) are independent of one another and that
yit is conditionally independent of εit+1 which is i.i.d. over time. The independence of
these three transition densities allows computation of the three integrals in the con-
tinuation value sequentially instead of simultaneously. As can be seen, the transition
densities for total U.S. exports, xt, and firm level employment, wit, do not depend
on the export decision, yit−1. This assumption is not very restrictive for U.S. ex-
ports but may be more so for firm level employment. Given the relative importance
of domestic sales versus exports, however, U.S. firms likely make their employment
decisions independently of their export profile. Therefore, I think it is a reasonable
assumption that goes a long way towards making the model tractable.
The transition for firm employment is
pw (wit+1 | wt) = τ−1w φTR
(




where I assume the same form for px (xt+1 | xt) and φTR (·) denotes the trun-
cated normal distribution. Truncating the possible shocks to the state variables is
a prerequisite for using Chebyshev functional approximation which I use to get the
expected value function. With that said, I truncate to within 6 standard deviations
of the observed shocks. Since these processes are independent of the export decision,
I can estimate their parameters using OLS prior to solving the structural model.
This trades statistical efficiency in the estimation of the parameters governing these
transitions for a reduction in the computational burden of the structural model.
Assuming that εit (yit) is distributed type-one extreme value (T1EV)
1 i.i.d. across
1The type-one extreme value distribution, also known as the Gumbel distribution, is governed by
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choices, time and firms allows me to invoke McFadden (1974) and Rust (1987) and
obtain a contraction mapping that defines the expected value function in closed form
V (yit−1, wit, xt) = ln
∑
y∗it





where y∗it indexes all 2
C combinations of the destination vector yit that the
firm could choose this period, Et+1 [·] is the expectation against the remaining state
variables (wit+1, xt+1) and V (yit−1, wit, xt) ≡ Eε [V (yit−1, wit, xt, εit)] defines the ex-
pected value function. The T1EV assumption on the error also implies the familiar
multinomial logit form for the conditional choice probability
P [ỹit | yit−1, wit, xt] =
exp [π (ỹit,yit−1, wit, xt) + δEt+1 [V (ỹit, wit+1, xt+1)]]∑
y∗it




This is the probability the set of destinations ỹit is selected given the equations
in the model, structural parameters, transition densities, and firm’s observable state
(yit−1, wit, xt).
2.4.3 Likelihood
The likelihood contribution of each firm in each time period is determined by the
probability of observing the export destinations yit and log revenues rcit from each
market
lit (θ | yit,yit−1, xt, wit, rit) =
(
P [ỹit | yit−1, xt, wit]
∏
c
f (rcit | ycit = 1, xt, wit)
)1(ỹit=yit)
(2.19)
the location parameter µ and scale parameter σ. If an i.i.d. random variable ε ∼ T1EV (µ, σ), then
mode (ε) = µ, V [ε] =
π2
6
σ2, and E [ε] = µ+ σγ where γ ≈ 0.5772 is the Euler-Mascheroni constant.
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where P [·] is the conditional choice probability from (2.18) and f (·) is the distribu-
tion of log revenue given in expression (2.10). The variable ỹit is a set of destinations
for which the probability is defined by the model and the indicator 1 (ỹit = yit) is on
when that same set is observed in the data as being selected by firm i in period t.
The time series observations run from t = 1, . . . T and as such I do not observe the
export destination set served prior to the start of the sample, yi0. The key here will
be to define a new expression for P [ỹi1 | yi0, x1, wi1] that does not depend on yi0. I
will retain the same assumptions that the unobserved state variables are T1EV and
employ a flexible functional form of the log of total employment at the firm, wi1 in
the first observed period
P [ỹi1 | wi1] =
exp [
∑








The contribution to the likelihood provided by the level of revenue is not needed
in this initial period. Since participation in (2.18) is not a function of revenue, I
bypass the selection issue in the initial period. Furthermore, the revenue distribution
is independent over time so specifying an initial condition for revenue is unnecessary.
The likelihood accounting for the initial conditions correction is






P [ỹit | yit−1, xt, wit]
∏
c
f (rcit | ycit = 1, wit, xt)
)1(ỹit=yit)
P [ỹi1 | wi1]1(ỹi1=yi1)
(2.21)
Let the vector θ = (g, bc, fc, εc, αc, βc, γc, σc, ψc, ξc) collect all the parameters of
the model that will be estimated in the structural routine. The likelihood is the
probability of observing the initial set of destinations and then the sequence of country
choices and revenue levels over time for all the firms in the sample.
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2.4.4 Estimation
Maximizing the likelihood itself is not sufficient since I need to ensure any pa-
rameters are also consistent with the forward looking behavior of the firm defined by
the value function above. To estimate the parameters of the model and ensure they
satisfy the model I employ Mathematical Programing with Equilibrium Constraints
(MPEC). This method allows maximization of the likelihood function subject to the
constraints that define the value function. First introduced in the economics litera-
ture by Su and Judd (2012), MPEC has been shown to be an important improvement
when parameter estimation implies solving an additional optimization problem.
There are two key benefits to MPEC over the nested fixed point (NFP) method
introduced by Rust (1987). First, MPEC is more numerically stable than NFP ac-
cording to Dubé, Fox and Su (2012). The intuition for this result is quite simple.
Since NFP requires using a parameter vector selected in an outer loop as an input to
solving the model in an inner loop, the likelihood value for that parameter vector de-
pends on the parameters and on quality of the solution to the model in the inner loop.
Imprecise solutions to the model can give incorrect inference regarding the most likely
parameter vector. The second benefit of MPEC is a reduction in computation time by
exploiting recent developments from operations research and computer science in the
area of robust constrained optimization. Given the potential size of the state space,
being able to provide the solver with analytical gradients of the likelihood and using
Chebyshev function approximation to search over Chebyshev coefficients instead of
value function points on a grid also provides significant computational savings.
The MPEC constraint is a functional equation defined by the expected value
function in (2.17). In order to solve this problem on a computer, it needs to be
discretized. Finding the expected value function on a grid is a common approach.
However, a priori definition of a grid for the state variables is restrictive and could
possibly lead to incorrect inference. I want to allow the data to inform the estimates
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as much as possible without forcing these variables onto a grid. Additionally, as the
number of grid points grows the quality of approximation increases but so too does
the computation time.
Instead of searching for the value function at each point in a discrete state space I
search for the Chebyshev coefficients that approximate the expected value function.
I employ the methods outlined in Judd (1998) and Judd (1992) to construct the
Chebyshev approximation to the expected value function as
V (yit−1, wit, xt) ≈ ryit−1Λ (wit, xt) (2.22)
where ryit−1 is a 1×R vector of Chebyshev coefficients and Λ (wit, xt) is an R× 1
vector of Chebyshev polynomials evaluated at the continuous state variables. Cheby-
shev polynomial approximation is not well suited to the approximation of discontinu-
ous functions and I want to allow the state variable yit−1 to possibly result in discrete
jumps in the expected value function. Therefore, I allow the coefficients ryit−1 to differ
for each possible set of destinations yit−1 that might be selected.
Using the Chebyshev approximation, the final MPEC problem searches for the




ln [L (θ | yit,yit−1, wit, xt)]
subject to
ryit−1Λ (wit, xt) = ln
(∑
y∗it
exp [π (y∗it,yit−1, wit, xt) + δEt+1 [ryitΛ (wit+1, xt+1)]]
)
where the objective function is defined in (2.21) and the constraint defining the
functional equation version of the expected value function is from (2.17). The two
integrals in Et+1 [·] are against pw (wit+1 | wt) and px (xt+1 | xt). They are computed




The only other paper that has estimated the up-front cost of exporting for the
U.S. is Lincoln and McCallum (2012). They use a two country model so there is
no distinction between country specific and global entry costs. Altering my model
to match their two country framework and using the same sample of manufacturing
plants from the Metal Forgings and Stampings (SIC 346) industry provides the esti-
mates presented in Table 2.7. Entry costs in my model are $3.84 million and $5.35
million in their paper. Given that the estimation techniques in these two papers
differ dramatically, the similarity of these estimates suggests my model captures the
fundamental features of the exporting decision well.
The next set of results in Table 2.8 employes the country specific export data
for the same industry and restricts the set of countries to Canada and Mexico. To
be explicit, in each period the firm can choose among four options: not to export,
to export to Canada, to export to Mexico or to export to both. The global entry
cost for this sample is estimated to be zero and the country specific entry costs are
$3.71 and $3.59 million year 2000 USD for Canada and Mexico, respectively. The re-
maining structural parameters of the model are also reported in Table 2.8 along with
measures of model performance. These performance measures are calculated using
the structural parameter estimates and assumptions on the error terms to simulate
a dataset and then calculate moments of the simulated data. The first moment is
the fraction of firms that export to each country. Armenter and Koren (2012) argue
that the fraction of firms that export can be a particularly informative moment for
distinguishing between models of the participation margin of trade. As can be seen
in the table, the model matches the data quite well. The second moment measures
how often country-firm-year export status predictions in the model match the ob-
served data. In other words, this is the fraction of observations where the model
correctly predicts export status. It should be noted that this is the most restrictive
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moment for export status since the model is only counted as correct when it gets the
country-firm-year prediction right. The final set of moments are means and standard
deviations of the expected revenue in the model and observed revenue in the data.
Only positive revenue observations are used to calculate these. Both the mean and
standard deviation of the simulated revenue match the data and suggest the simple
revenue process I use performs well.
Table 2.9 presents estimates using the same sample of firms in the Metal Forgings
and Stampings (SIC 346) industry over 1992-2007 but expanding the set of countries
from Canada and Mexico to the top 5 U.S. export destinations. I define the top 5
destinations using the average fraction of total manufactured goods exported from
the U.S. to these countries over the years 1992-2007. The global entry cost estimate
in this case is $20 thousand and the country specific entry costs are are $3.7 million
for Canada, $4.16 million for Japan, $3.58 million for Mexico, $4.22 million for the
United Kingdom, and $3.63 million for Germany where all values are in year 2000
USD. I report the same measures of model performance and again conclude the model
fits well.
Tables 2.10 and 2.11 attempt to test for Asian and European regional comple-
mentarities in entry costs. In this case, the regional entry cost is paid if the firm
exported to a country in the region this period but did not export to any country in
the region last period. In both of these tables, there is evidence that regional entry
costs are about one third the size of country specific entry costs. In particular, the
model estimates that it costs $1.64 million to access the first Asian country and then
$3.28 million for Japan, $3.47 million for China, $3.67 million for Korea, and $3.61
million for Taiwan thereafter. A similar pattern emerges for Europe where the first
European country costs $1.27 million and adding the United Kingdom costs $3.65
million, accessing Germany costs $3.09 million, entering France costs $4.47 million
and adding The Netherlands costs $3.82 million. As in the previous cases, the model
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simulated moments match the data well. At first glance the size of regional entry
costs may contrast with the reduced form results. These estimates, however, are for
one industry and do not presently control for unobserved heterogeneity.
2.6 Extensions and conclusions
I plan to make a few improvements to the reduced form and structural model in
order to solidify the main result that entry costs are mostly country specific. These
improvements will focus on controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and serially cor-
related errors. For the reduced form, I plan to employ the Butler and Moffit (1982)
random effects quadrature based estimator which allows for both initial conditions
and serially correlated errors. Additionally, I will employ the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-
Keane (GHK) multivariate normal random effects simulations based estimator. Each
of these estimators makes a number of strong assumptions, namely that unobserved
heterogeneity is normally distributed and uncorrelated with other regressors, but pro-
vides explicit solutions for initial conditions and serially correlated errors. Finally,
since the dependent variable is binary I will also employ the probit and logit bias
reduced modified maximum likelihood technique developed by Carro (2007). While
this estimator requires assuming the error term is i.i.d. normal or logistically dis-
tributed it can handle fixed effects, lagged dependent variables, time fixed effects and
reduces the Nickell bias from order O (T−1) to O (T−2). This reduction in the bias
order could be quite significant for my relatively long time span of 13 years.
The structural model will be extended by adding non-parametric firm types that
do not vary over time in a discrete mixture model framework. By allowing all pa-
rameters of the model to vary by permanent firm type, I will be able to control for
a significant amount of unobserved heterogeneity not currently accounted for in the
structural model.
This paper provides a first step towards uncovering the structure of export entry
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costs. I show that entry costs are mostly country specfic and estimate that it costs
U.S. firms in the Metal Forgings and Stampings (SIC 346) industry $20 thousand to
get started exporting anywhere and between $3.5 and $4.25 million to break into each
of the five main U.S. export destinations.
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Table 2.1: Number of firms and average exports per firm
Country Number of firms Exports per firm ($m)
Canada 25,427 1.28




















New Zealand 3,174 0.24






















Dominican Republic 1,334 0.85
Egypt 1,302 0.89
Kuwait 1,084 0.50
El Salvador 1,011 0.47
Russia 925 1.18
Honduras 899 0.72
These are the 50 most common destinations for U.S. exports. The number of firms
and average exports per firm are calculated in each year then averaged over the sample
1992-2007. Exports are in millions of year 2000 USD.
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Table 2.2: Number of countries entered by firm size
Employees Mean entered St. Dev. entered
[20, 50) 1.11 0.43
[50, 150) 1.18 0.69
[150, 500) 1.24 0.93
[500, 1000) 1.34 0.98
≥ 1000 1.30 0.83
Firms enter one destination when they start exporting. Mean and standard deviation
are of the number of destinations entered when a firm starts exporting. Rows define
firm size categories by number of employees. The results are the same when Canada
is not treated as a foreign market. Entry here is defined as exporting in the present
year after not exporting for any of the past three years. Having not exported in the
past two years or not exporting in the past year also gives the same result. Firms
do not dramatically increase the number of destinations served up to five years after
their initial entry into international markets.
Table 2.3: Number of countries entered






An overwhelming majority of firms enter only a few markets when they start ex-
porting. The columns provides the percent of firms and the cumulative percent that
entered 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 or more destinations when they started exporting. Like table
2.2, these results do not depend on length of export history used to define entry or
if Canada is treated as a foreign market. Neither do firms dramatically increase the
number of destinations served up to five years after initial entry into international
markets.
37
Table 2.4: Entry measures by firm size
Employees Exp./Emp. Exp. Exp./Dest. Firms
[20, 50) 2,181 69,042 63,316 11,410
[50, 150) 1,043 83,535 66,149 8,558
[150, 500) 503 116,281 94,380 1,816
[500, 1000) 369 270,565 135,614 233
≥ 1000 164 360,552 232,371 133
Each column is calculated by taking the mean across firms in each employee category
in the first year of exporting experience. Exports per employee, total firm exports,
and exports per destination are in year 2000 USD deflated using NBER revenue price
deflators at the four digit SIC industry level. The final column is the number of
firms in that employment category. Entry here is defined as exporting in the present
year after not exporting for any of the past three years. Having not exported in the
past two years or in the past year gives similar results. Treating Canada as the U.S.
domestic market also gives similar results.
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Figure 2.1: The effect of exporting experience
As firm size increases, the probablity of exporting anywhere increases (all lines). The
probability of exporting to a given destination is essentially unchanged for firms that
have experience exporting to at least one other country (dash) and those that have
no exporting experience (dot). Country specific experience, however, dramatically
increases the probability of exporting to that country again (solid). The fact that
country specific experience raises the probability of exporting to a country while
general exporting experience does not suggests the magnitude of country specific
entry costs are much larger than any global cost that might exist.
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Figure 2.2: US export variance decomposition for top 50 countries
Variation in total U.S. exports across destinations in a given year is mainly
determined by variation in the number of firms that export to each destination.
On average, the participation margin contributed 41 percent of the total variance
over 1992-2007. Removing Canada, or both Canada and Mexico leaves each
component with one third of the total variance. The remaining portion in each
year is from the covariance between the number of firms and average exports per firm.
To be more explicit about the construction of this figure denote total ex-
ports from the U.S. to country c in a given year t as Xct ≡ Nctx̄ct where
Nct is the number of firms exporting to c and x̄ct is average exports
per firm. Take logs to get ln (Xct) ≡ ln (Nct) + ln (x̄ct). Next compute
the variance across countries of both sides holding the year fixed to get
Vt [ln (Xct)] ≡ Vt [ln (Nct)] + Vt [ln (x̄ct)] + 2COVt [ln (Nct) , ln (x̄ct)]. Finally, di-
vide both sides by Vt [ln (Xct)] so each term is expressed as a fraction of the total
variance of U.S. exports across destinations.
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Table 2.5: dependent variable ycit
OLS AB WG2 WG3
ycit−1 41.40*** 26.19*** 19.50*** 18.75***
(0.09) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12)
ycit−2 20.33*** 9.10*** 4.54*** 4.36***
(0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
ycit−3 15.30*** 3.16*** -0.78*** -0.98***
(0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08)
nit−1 0.68*** 0.73*** 0.69***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
nit−2 -0.07*** 0.08*** 0.11***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
nit−3 -0.15*** 0.06*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
controls xit−1, xct−1 xit−1, xct−1 xit−1, xct−1
controls xit−2, xct−2 xit−2, xct−2 xit−2, xct−2
controls xit−3, xct−3 xit−3, xct−3 xit−3, xct−3
FE δt δt, δci δt, δci δit, δci, δct
Observations 19,696,400 19,696,400 19,696,400 19,696,400
Overall R2 0.611 - 0.525 0.564
Firm clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Significant at 1% *** 5% ** and 10% *
This linear probability model gives coefficients that are interpreted as marginal
changes in probability. Considering column AB and holding all else constant, if a
firm exported to country c last year, the probability they export to c this year in-
creases by 26.19 percentage points. If they exported to one location other than c,
the probability they export to c this year increases by 0.73 percentage points. The
magnitude of the country specific effect, ycit−h, is much larger than the effect of the
number of other countries served, nit−h, implying that sunk export entry costs are
mainly country specific. The columns use OLS, Arellano and Bond (1991) (AB) and
within-group (WG) estimation methods. Columns OLS and WG2 provide upper and
lower bounds on the country specific effect while AB provides a consistent estimate.
WG3 includes all possible interacted fixed effects which are collinear with the num-
ber of other countries served. The fact that WG2 and WG3 give similar estimates of
country specific persistence suggests that xit−h and xct−h control for essentially the
same variables as the fixed effects δit and δct. Consistency of the AB estimator relies
on zero serial correlation in the first differenced errors. The Arellano and Bond AR(2)
test has a null of no autocorrelation in the second lag of the first differenced errors
and returns p− value = 0.356 in the model above.
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Table 2.6: dependent variable ycit
OLS AB WG2 WG3
ycit−1 41.08*** 26.08*** 19.33*** 18.76***
(0.093) (0.132) (0.115) (0.122)
ycit−2 20.02*** 9.04*** 4.36*** 4.22***
(0.079) (0.103) (0.077) (0.082)
ycit−3 14.95*** 3.13*** -0.94*** -1.11***
(0.070) (0.103) (0.072) (0.076)
n
coly
it−1 0.11*** 1.64*** -0.13*** -0.08**
(0.032) (0.172) (0.038) (0.041)
n
coly
it−2 0.11*** 0.83*** -0.10*** -0.10**
(0.037) (0.093) (0.037) (0.041)
n
coly
it−3 0.14*** 0.44*** -0.09** -0.11***
(0.032) (0.069) (0.036) (0.040)
n
ctig
it−1 0.51*** -0.08 0.51*** 0.73***
(0.038) (0.132) (0.045) (0.047)
n
ctig
it−2 0.21*** 0.04 0.31*** 0.36***
(0.043) (0.083) (0.042) (0.044)
n
ctig
it−3 0.11*** 0.12* 0.22*** 0.27***
(0.038) (0.073) (0.042) (0.045)
ncurrit−1 -0.69*** -0.42*** -0.26*** -0.21***
(0.035) (0.045) (0.037) (0.038)
ncurrit−2 -0.08* -0.12*** -0.06 -0.14***
(0.045) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040)
ncurrit−3 0 -0.34*** -0.12*** -0.16***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037)
ndistit−1 0.40*** 0.82*** 0.49*** 0.21***
(0.018) (0.079) (0.021) (0.021)
ndistit−2 -0.03 0.29*** 0.12*** 0.07***
(0.020) (0.042) (0.019) (0.020)
ndistit−3 -0.10*** 0.19*** 0.08*** 0.05**
(0.017) (0.032) (0.019) (0.020)
n
lang
it−1 0.36*** 0.55*** 0.38*** 0.28***
(0.018) (0.130) (0.021) (0.022)
n
lang
it−2 0.05** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.13***
(0.021) (0.061) (0.020) (0.022)
n
lang
it−3 -0.07*** 0 0.11*** 0.08***
(0.017) (0.038) (0.019) (0.021)
n
legl
it−1 0.44*** 0.22*** 0.45*** 0.09***
(0.016) (0.072) (0.018) (0.018)
n
legl
it−2 -0.01 -0.04 0.10*** 0.05***
(0.017) (0.036) (0.017) (0.018)
n
legl
it−3 -0.04*** 0 0.09*** 0.06***
(0.015) (0.026) (0.016) (0.017)
n
pcap
it−1 0.38*** 0.49*** 0.24*** 0.12***
(0.012) (0.030) (0.013) (0.014)
n
pcap
it−2 -0.03** 0.07*** -0.01 0
(0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014)
n
pcap
it−3 0.04*** 0.10*** 0.03*** 0
(0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014)
n
regn
it−1 0.73*** -0.41*** 0.72*** 0.66***
(0.021) (0.113) (0.025) (0.026)
n
regn
it−2 0 -0.34*** 0.18*** 0.21***
(0.025) (0.055) (0.024) (0.025)
n
regn
it−3 -0.13*** -0.21*** 0.06** 0.14***
(0.021) (0.040) (0.023) (0.025)
n
rtag
it−1 0.08*** 0.57*** 0.10*** -0.02
(0.017) (0.039) (0.018) (0.019)
n
rtag
it−2 -0.06*** 0.11*** 0.02 -0.04*
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
n
rtag
it−3 -0.15*** 0.02 0.08*** -0.04*
(0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
controls xit−1, xct−1 xit−1, xct−1 xit−1, xct−1
controls xit−2, xct−2 xit−2, xct−2 xit−2, xct−2
controls xit−3, xct−3 xit−3, xct−3 xit−3, xct−3
FE δt δt, δci δt, δci δit, δci, δct
Observations 19,696,400 19,696,400 19,696,400 19,696,400
Overall R2 0.611 - 0.530 0.565
Firm clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Significant at 1% *** 5% ** and 10% *
Sunk entry costs do not exhibit large complimentarities since exporting to similar countries in the
past does not much increase the probability of exporting to a country. The covariates nit−h count the
number of countries other than c to which firm i exported in year t−h that share a common, colonial
relationship (coly), contiguous border (ctig), currency (curr), distance from the U.S. (dist), language
(lang), legal origin (legl), per capita GDP (pcap), region (regn), and memberships in regional trade
agreements (rtag). The columns use OLS, Arellano and Bond (1991) (AB) and within-group (WG)
estimation methods. Consistency of the AB estimator relies on zero serial correlation in the first
differenced errors. The Arellano and Bond AR(2) test has a null of no autocorrelation in the second
lag of the first differenced errors and returns p− value = 0.153 in the model above.
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Table 2.7: Structural estimates: data from Lincoln and McCallum (2012)
Metal Forgings and Stampings (SIC 346)
estimate (standard error)
Net profit parameters
global entry cost (g) 3.84 (0.03)
period fixed cost (f) 0.15 (0.08)
elasticity of substitution (ε) 482.96 (26.60)
Revenue parameters
constant (α) -12.95 (0.33)
employment elasticity (β) 1.84 (0.01)
total exports elasticity (γ) 0.25 (0.03)
error standard deviation (σ) 1.27 (0.01)
Initial conditions
constant (ψ) -3.78 (0.00)
firm size elasticity (ξ) 0.91 (0.00)
Percent of firms that export
data 82.56
model 82.25
Model correctly predicts export status
percent 71.91
Export revenue, mean (standard deviation)
data 43.06 (62.18)
model 69.92 (86.72)
These estimates use the model in this paper and the data employed in Lincoln and
McCallum (2012) over 1992-2003. Parameters g and f are in millions of year 1987
USD. The remaining parameters, other than constants, are elasticities. Firm clustered
standard errors using 20 bootstrapped samples are in parentheses.
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Table 2.8: Structural estimates: Canada and Mexico
Metal Forgings and Stampings (SIC 346)
Canada Mexico
Net profit parameters
global entry cost (g) 0.00 (0.00)
country entry cost (b) 3.71 (0.09) 3.59 (0.01)
period fixed cost (f) 0.36 (0.42) 2.02 (0.02)
elasticity of substitution (ε) 5.27 (254.4) 1.00 (0.00)
Revenue parameters
constant (α) -12.76 (0.91) -38.31 (0.17)
employment elasticity (β) 0.97 (0.03) 0.60 (0.01)
total exports elasticity (γ) 0.5 (0.06) 2.64 (0.01)
error standard deviation (σ) 1.81 (0.01) 1.91 (0.01)
Initial conditions
constant (ψ) -5.65 (0.00) -6.77 (0.00)
firm size elasticity (ξ) 1.25 (0.00) 0.84 (0.00)
Percent of firms that export
data 58.76 21.55
model 58.07 21.24
Model correctly predicts export status
percent 57.75 72.81
Export revenue, mean (standard deviation)
data 0.94 (2.76) 0.55 (1.85)
model 1.31 (2.90) 0.64 (0.73)
Firms are only able to choose to export to these countries. The sample includes 351
firms over 16 years from 1992 to 2007. Parameters g, b and f are in millions of year
2000 USD. The remaining parameters, other than constants, are elasticities. Firm
clustered standard errors using 20 bootstrapped samples are in parentheses.
44
Table 2.9: Structural estimates: top 5 destinations
Metal Forgings and Stampings (SIC 346)
Canada Japan Mexico U.K. Germany
Net profit parameters
global entry cost (g) 0.02
country entry cost (b) 3.70 4.16 3.58 4.22 3.63
period fixed cost (f) 0.36 1.48 2.02 1.11 1.09
elasticity of substitution (ε) 5.22 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.00
Revenue parameters
constant (α) -12.75 -14.88 -38.20 -12.26 -10.37
employment elasticity (β) 0.97 0.59 0.60 0.50 0.47
total exports elasticity (γ) 0.50 0.73 2.63 0.57 0.42
error standard deviation (σ) 1.81 1.94 1.91 1.88 1.95
Initial conditions
constant (ψ) -5.65 -8.74 -6.77 -6.19 -6.22
firm size elasticity (ξ) 1.25 1.21 0.84 1.02 0.89
Percent of firms that export
data 58.76 9.94 21.55 21.47 16.77
model 58.07 10.06 20.82 19.94 16.45
Model correctly predicts export status
percent 57.75 84.74 71.99 72.72 74.72
Export revenue, mean (standard deviation)
data 0.94 (2.76) 0.60 (1.92) 0.55 (1.85) 0.61 (3.44) 0.41 (1.10)
model 1.31 (2.90) 0.57 (0.58) 0.63 (0.74) 0.51 (0.39) 0.50 (0.36)
Firms are only able to choose to export to these countries. The sample includes
351 firms over 16 years from 1992 to 2007. Parameters g, b and f are in millions
of year 2000 USD. The remaining parameters, other than constants, are elasticities.
Standard errors are forthcoming.
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Table 2.10: Structural estimates: top Asian destinations
Metal Forgings and Stampings (SIC 346)
Japan China Korea Taiwan
Net profit parameters
global entry cost (g) 1.64 (0.02)
country entry cost (b) 3.28 (0.05) 3.47 (0.01) 3.67 (0.01) 3.61 (0.03)
period fixed cost (f) 1.09 (0.18) 0.97 (0.01) 1.10 (0.02) 1.03 (0.12)
elasticity of substitution (ε) 1.00 (150.1) 1.47 (0.01) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (150.1)
Revenue parameters
constant (α) -2.67 (8.27) -15.14 (0.05) -8.43 (0.65) -9.36 (7.74)
employment elasticity (β) 0.51 (0.06) 0.41 (0.01) 0.48 (0.01) 0.47 (0.04)
total exports elasticity (γ) -0.22 (0.64) 0.83 (0.01) 0.24 (0.05) 0.31 (0.61)
error standard deviation (σ) 1.96 (0.04) 1.92 (0.01) 1.91 (0.01) 1.85 (0.04)
Initial conditions
constant (ψ) -8.74 (0.00) -7.98 (0.00) -8.73 (0.00) -7.33 (0.00)
firm size elasticity (ξ) 1.21 (0.00) 0.87 (0.00) 1.14 (0.00) 0.89 (0.00)
Percent of firms that export
data 9.94 8.85 6.55 6.04
model 9.56 11.36 6.34 5.98
Model correctly predicts export status
percent 85.42 83.00 89.92 88.84
Export revenue, mean (standard deviation)
data 0.60 (1.92) 0.41 (0.96) 0.34 (0.86) 0.36 (1.00)
model 0.61 (0.47) 0.42 (0.25) 0.45 (0.35) 0.28 (0.24)
Firms are only able to choose to export to these countries. The sample includes 351
firms over 16 years from 1992 to 2007. Parameters g, b and f are in millions of year
2000 USD. The remaining parameters, other than constants, are elasticities. Firm
clustered standard errors using 20 bootstrapped samples are in parentheses.
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Table 2.11: Structural estimates: top European destinations
Metal Forgings and Stampings (SIC 346)
U.K. Germany France the Netherlands
Net profit parameters
global entry cost (g) 1.27
country entry cost (b) 3.65 3.09 4.47 3.82
period fixed cost (f) 0.64 0.80 0.58 0.69
elasticity of substitution (ε) 1.55 1.00 4.69 1.00
Revenue parameters
constant (α) -5.34 -0.95 -16.00 -11.16
employment elasticity (β) 0.47 0.41 0.57 0.55
total exports elasticity (γ) 0.02 -0.32 0.84 0.41
error standard deviation (σ) 1.89 1.95 1.96 1.55
Initial conditions
constant (ψ) -6.19 -6.22 -7.09 -6.54
firm size elasticity (ξ) 1.02 0.89 0.97 0.79
Percent of firms that export
data 21.47 16.77 10.86 8.19
model 20.90 17.74 11.18 7.83
Model correctly predicts export status
percent 69.98 73.97 82.37 86.36
Export revenue, mean (standard deviation)
data 0.61 (3.44) 0.41 (1.10) 0.59 (1.61) 0.15 (0.33)
model 0.48 (0.34) 0.46 (0.26) 0.56 (0.57) 0.15 (0.12)
Firms are only able to choose to export to these countries. The sample includes
351 firms over 16 years from 1992 to 2007. Parameters g, b and f are in millions
of year 2000 USD. The remaining parameters, other than constants, are elasticities.
Standard errors are forthcoming.
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CHAPTER III
Entry Costs and Increasing Trade
3.1 Introduction
A common feature of the rise in aggregate exports from several countries across
the world is a significant expansion in the number of firms that export. A natural
explanation that has been suggested by prior authors (e.g., Melitz 2003) is that the
up-front costs of entering foreign markets have declined.1 We test this idea for the
first time using plant level data from the United States Census. We find that the U.S.
also saw significant foreign market entry over the period, with the fraction of plants
that export rising from 21% in 1987 to 39% in 2006.2 Across a number of different
estimation approaches, however, we find little evidence for the idea that declines in
the costs of entering foreign markets played a significant role in driving these trends.
We instead argue that changes in other factors that govern export status, specifically
foreign income, were of a sufficient magnitude to explain the level of foreign market
entry that we see in the data, without the need to appeal to falling entry costs.
Our analysis begins by presenting a number of descriptive statistics that provide
new insight into the U.S. experience. We find that the rise in the fraction of plants
selling abroad mentioned above was broad-based; it was experienced across a broad
1See also Roberts and Tybout (1997a).
2We discuss our data and how these and other figures are calculated in Section 3.2.
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range of industries as well as geographic regions. These extensive margin adjustments
were matched with strong intensive margin adjustments, with average foreign sales
per exporter also increasing substantially. Over time, changes along both of these
margins had a large influence on aggregate trade volumes. Finally, at the same time
that more plants began to sell abroad, the level of persistence in export market status
remained quite stable.
We next turn to understanding how much declines in the costs of entering foreign
markets contributed to these trends. As these costs cannot be directly observed
with current data sources, we need to use models of firm behavior to estimate their
magnitude. Thus, to get a comprehensive perspective we consider both reduced form
and structural estimation approaches. Our reduced form analyses provide a tractable
way of addressing this question for U.S. manufacturing as a whole and allow for a
wide variety of robustness checks. This approach does not provide direct estimates of
the magnitude of changes in these costs but coefficients in the regressions are directly
related to them. We let these coefficients differ across the earlier and later parts of
the sample to look at how the costs compare. The estimated parameters have similar
magnitudes in the two different periods. These findings suggest minimal changes in
the barriers to entry in foreign markets.
We then turn to a set of structural estimations that use the methodology de-
veloped by Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007). This approach allows us to estimate
the average foreign market entry costs in dollars that plants face in a given period.
The methodology is attractive in that it provides numerical estimates of how these
costs have changed and can flexibly account for plant and time specific unobservable
factors that determine exporting behavior. Estimations require the use of computa-
tionally intensive Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov Chain methods, however. We are
thus constrained to a set of four industries. We estimate these costs across 1987-1997
and 1992-2003 and compare the results for these two time periods. Three of the four
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industries that we consider experienced roughly similar or rising costs across the two
different panels and the fourth saw a moderate decline. Taken together, the results
from the reduced form and structural estimations are evidence that declines in the
costs of entering foreign markets have been modest at best. The level of respon-
siveness of export market participation to changes in the costs of entering foreign
markets predicted by recent models of international trade suggest that these changes
are unlikely to have played a large role in the changes that we see in the data.
We conclude with an analysis of whether changes in other factors that determine
export status were of a sufficient magnitude to cause the large increase in export
particpiation. Specifically, we investigate whether a calibrated model of plant hetero-
geneity and international trade akin to that of Chaney (2008) can match the extensive
margin adjustments we see in the data. Keeping other factors such as the costs of
entering foreign markets as well as trade-related variable costs stable, we find that
growth in foreign income is sufficient to explain the rise in the fraction of exporters.
Our accounting exercise demonstrates that a reduction in the costs of entering for-
eign markets is not needed to account for these trends in a standard model. These
calculations lend credibility to our estimation results and point to a significant role
for foreign economic growth in explaining the rise of trade.
Our work addresses an issue that is relevant for a number of other countries in ad-
dition to the U.S. Several other studies have suggested that large-scale foreign market
entry was experienced worldwide during this period. Indeed, of the studies that have
used plant or firm level data to study the rise in exports from other nations, many
have found that entry into foreign markets played a significant role in the expansion
of trade. This work includes studies on the experiences of Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
and Morocco.3 Although there is little plant-level evidence on this question outside
3These papers include Bergoeing, Micco, and Repetto (2011), Roberts, Sullivan, and Tybout
(1995), and Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1996). Roberts and Tybout (1997a) provide a survey of
several of these papers. A notable exception here is China; see Amiti and Freund (2010). In the U.S.
context, Bernard and Jensen (2004a) have also previously documented a significant increase in the
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of these countries, we also see dramatic increases in the number of goods sold across
countries in disaggregated industry-level trade data. These results are consistent with
substantial foreign market entry by firms in different sectors for a wide range of coun-
tries. Papers documenting these trends include Evenett and Venables (2002), Broda
and Weinstein (2006), and Harris, Kónya, and Mátyás (2011). Particularly notable is
an acceleration in the growth of varieties traded during 1987-2006. Taken together,
these studies suggest that our estimations address a question of first-order importance
for understanding the recent growth of worldwide trade.
Our analysis also fills a significant gap in the international trade literature. A
large number of studies have looked at the effect of changes in variable trade costs on
export and import patterns. While there has been some work on other factors such as
transportation costs, this work has primarily focused on understanding the effects of
changes in tariffs. Yet these costs are only one, albeit important, piece of the puzzle.
Changes in the barriers to entry in foreign markets also can have significant effects
on trade patterns. One reason why these changes have not yet been studied is that
methods to estimate their magnitude have only been developed relatively recently.
Another is that the data requirements for looking at how they have changed are quite
high. This study represents an initial effort to address this issue.
In the next section, we discuss our data sources and document several new stylized
facts about U.S. plants’ exporting behavior from 1987 to 2006. Section 3.3 uses
a model of export behavior to motivate reduced form estimations on the evolving
nature of these costs. In Section 3.4 we describe the structural model that we use
to estimate changes in these costs and the results that we get from our estimations.
Section 3.5 performs an accounting exercise that looks at the contribution of other
factors to the rise in export market participation such as increases in foreign income.
fraction of manufacturing plants that export over the period 1987-1992. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott
(2009) additionally report significant extensive margin entry for U.S. firms in goods (agriculture,
manufacturing, and mining) sectors across the two years 1993 and 2000.
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Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data and Stylized Facts
We use data from a number of different sources. Our data on aggregate industry
exports come from two sources (i) the United Nations’ Commodity Trade Statistics
Database (Comtrade) and (ii) data from the U.S. Census that was concorded to the
1987 U.S. SIC classification system using the approach described in Pierce and Schott
(2012). Information on price deflators is obtained from the NBER manufacturing
productivity database (Bartelsman and Gray, 1996). The primary microdata for
our analyses come from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) and Census of
Manufacturers (CMF) from the U.S. Census. Both data sets contain information
on the operations of U.S. manufacturing plants. The CMF is conducted in every
year ending in 2 or 7 (e.g. 1987, 1992, etc.) and contains data on the universe of
manufacturing establishments. The ASM is a survey of plants that is conducted in
each intervening year. The sampling frames for these surveys are chosen two years
after the most recent CMF.4 These establishments are then followed over time for
five years until the next ASM sampling frame is implemented. Not all plants within
a firm are sampled with certainty during each ASM wave so we treat the plant as
the unit of analysis. This is consistent with the literature that has used this data as
well as a number of other trade-related studies on other countries. Wherever possible,
however, we perform robustness checks on our analysis at the level of the firm, finding
similar results. We begin our analyses in 1987, the first year that comprehensive data
on export revenues was collected.
4Over the period 1987-1998 plants with more than 250 employees were sampled with certainty
in the ASM. In the 1999-2003 ASM this threshold was increased to 500 employees and was further
raised to 1000 in the 2004-2008 ASM. As the sampling probability is inversely related to a plant’s
contribution to output, plants between 250 and 500 employees are still sampled with a high degree
of certainty 1999-2003, however. In our estimations that span these years, we reweight the plants
accordingly.
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The sample designs of these data sets impose some structure on our analysis. The
ASM includes large plants with certainty but samples smaller plants according to
their contribution to output. Due to the loss of non-certainty cases across different
ASM panels, we limit our sample for panel analyses to plants with 250 or more
employees. This avoids a number of challenges involved in following smaller plants
over time and allows for comparability with previous studies that have used a similar
approach. Despite this restriction, however, our data covers a significant portion of
economic activity and the great majority of export volume.5 Arkolakis (2010) has
also suggested that small firms may only partially enter a foreign market making the
assumption of binary export status undergirding our analyses more appropriate for
large producers.
With these data we develop a number of new stylized facts regarding the pace
and character of trade growth since 1987. Figure 3.1 plots the percentage of plants
with 20 or more employees that export in each year from 1987 to 2003.6 The overall
upward trend is unmistakable; 21% of plants exported in 1987 and 35% exported in
2003. Although we focus our analyses on the 1987-2003 period, this percentage rises
steadily after 2003 to 39% in 2006. A number of different aspects of these trends
are of note. Firstly, given the secular declines in U.S. manufacturing, it is important
to know if these trends were driven by increases in the number of exporting plants
or declines in the number of manufacturing establishments in operation. Over 1987-
2003, the raw number of exporting plants increased by 34% while the total number
of plants decreased by 20%. These figures imply exporters and non-exporters largely
face the same entry and exit probabilities. We can also test this directly. Taking
the 21% participation rate from 1987 as a baseline, new plants that entered the
5Bernard and Jensen (2004a) use a similar sample and note that it accounts for 41% of employ-
ment, 52% of shipments, and 70% of exports in 1987.
6Similar to several other studies, we focus on plants with 20 or more employees. In all of our
analyses we drop administrative records, which are essentially imputed data for small employers
and new businesses. Due to disclosure concerns, estimates for 1987 and 1992 are from Bernard and
Jensen (2004b).
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sample and remained in business until 2002 were somewhat more apt to sell abroad.
Those that exited were only slightly less likely to be exporters. Finally, we can
abstract from entry and exit to understand how exporting status changed for existing
establishments. Amongst plants that had 20 or more employees in both the 1987
and 2002 Census of Manufacturers, 29% export in 1987 and 39% export in 2002.
This suggest that a large part of these trends were due to adjustments by plants
that were in operation in 1987 but only sold domestically. In summary, more plants
export than ever before, exporters exit at the same rate as non-exporters, entrants
are slightly more likely to export, and continuing plants are more likely to export.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 look at the sectoral and geographic dimensions of the rise in
export market participation. Figure 3.2 plots the percentage of plants that export
in each industry in 1987 and 2003. While some industries saw larger changes than
others, there has been a significant expansion in foreign market participation across
nearly all sectors of the economy. Figure 3.3 similarly demonstrates that the results in
Figure 3.1 were experienced broadly across different regions of the U.S. These results
hold generally across states as well. In Tables 3.1 and 3.2 we document the time path
of each of these trends across 5-6 year intervals, mostly using the CMF. While we
find similar patterns to the overall trend by region, there is more heterogeneity in the
timing and magnitude of foreign market entry across industries. The fact that the
expansion in the fraction of plants that export has been pervasive across these two
dimensions suggests that these trends were not driven by idiosyncratic factors such
as the rise of high-tech industries.
In a similar vein, we also looked at how the composition of the destinations of
aggregate exports changed over time. We find that although export volumes rose
sharply over the period, with a few exceptions trade shares have remained quite
stable. For example, Germany accounted for 5.4% of total U.S. exports in 1987 and
accounted for 5.8% in 2003. Among the top 40 export destinations in 1987, the rank
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correlation between export shares in 1987 and 2003 is 88%. These countries account
for 92% of total U.S. exports in 1987. We present the shares for the top 20 export
destinations in 1987 and their corresponding shares in 2003 in Table 3.4.
Although we focus on the determinants of changes in export status, it is clear
that there have also been significant expansions in total exports through the inten-
sive margin of trade. These changes suggest that the incentives to sell abroad have
increased significantly over time. In the aggregate, manufacturing exports as a per-
centage of GDP rose by 35% over the 1987-2003. In Figure 3.4 we graph the average
level of real foreign sales across exporting plants by year. Estimates are for plants
with 20 or more employees and exclude the computer and semiconductor industries
due to the strong decline in prices over time; estimates including all industries show
a significantly stronger increase over time. In order to look at percentage changes we
normalize these figures such that the average in 1987 is set equal to one. We find that
average foreign sales increased steadily by 49% over the time period. These results
are robust to limiting the sample to plants with at least 10 employees, plants with
at least 250 employees, and single plant firms. They also hold when looking at firms
in different Census of Manufacturers samples. Thus, even though both the number
and fraction of plants that export increased significantly, the average level of foreign
sales for each of these plants has also increased. Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011)
suggest that decreases in the costs of entering foreign markets should lower average
foreign sales; these figures thus suggest that either these costs have increased or that
other factors were important in determining export trends.
To get a sense of how changes in the extensive margin have affected overall trade
volumes, we use information from each year in which we have data from the Census
of Manufacturers. This allows us to track the universe of small as well as large plants
over time. The fact that the intensive margin dominates trade volumes in the short-
run has been documented by, among others, di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) and
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Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2009). Authors have only recently begun to
focus on the relative importance of the extensive margin for aggregate trade volumes
over longer time horizons, however. Table 3.5 reports the contribution to Census year
aggregate exports by plants that exported in a given prior Census year. When the
time horizon is greater than five years we limit these figures to plants that exported
in each intervening Census year. Thus, only 46% of aggregate exports in 2002 came
from plants that exported in 1987, 1992, and 1997. These numbers underestimate
the importance of changes along the extensive margin since they are not restricted
to plants that exported continuously in all prior years.7 Removing any continuous
exporting restriction, we find that 57% of trade in 2002 is from plants that export in
both 1987 and 2002.
In Figure 3.5 we look at annual rates of entry, exit, and export status persistence.
Plants that persist are those who continue exporting or only selling to the domestic
market. In each year we limit the sample to plants that existed in the previous
year, such that the percent of plants that enter, exit, and keep the same export
market status adds up to 100% in each year. Due to changes in the plants included
across different ASM sampling frames, we limit the graph to plants with 250 or more
employees. We find similar trends, however, within and across different ASM sampling
frames for plants with 20 or more employees. In order to make the changes in the
series clear we use two different axes, with entry and exit rates depicted using the
scale on the right axis and persistence levels on the left axis.
It is our expectation that if the barriers to entry in foreign markets fell dramat-
ically, we should see significantly less persistence in export market status over time.
Indeed, if they fell to zero, plants would be able to enter without cost. They would
7We are unable to calculate year-to-year statistics based on continuously exporting plants due to
the breaks between ASM panels. These figures echo related results reported in Bergoeing, Micco, and
Repetto (2011) for Chile 1990-2007, Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2009) for the aggregate
U.S. economy (including non-manufacturing sectors) for 1993-2003, and Eaton, Eslava, Kugler and
Tybout (2007) for Colombia 1996-2005. The analysis in Table 3.5 is done with the plant identifier
lbdnum. The results from using the alternative plant identifier ppn are similar.
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also be more likely to exit since re-entry would also be free. This intuition is devel-
oped more formally in Sections 3 and 4. We instead find that the level of persistence
stayed roughly constant over time, with a mean of 85% and a standard deviation of
less than 3%. The level of persistence amongst exporters, which can be denoted as
E [yit | yit−1 = 1] where yit is a 0/1 indicator for export status, also remained stable
over time. Thus, export market participation increased at the same time that export
status persistence remained stable. The rise in the number of exporters documented
in Figures 3.1-3.3 was driven by entry rates regularly outpacing exit rates, rather
than changes in the frequency of entry and exit. These results suggest that dramatic
declines in the costs of entering foreign markets are unlikely.
3.3 Reduced Form Estimations
In this section we consider reduced form evidence on how the costs of entering
foreign markets have changed over time. While our structural estimations in the fol-
lowing section will allow us to study a number of different industries in depth, the
reduced form will give us a sense of how these costs have changed for the manufactur-
ing sector as a whole. Drawing upon the seminal work of Dixit (1989) and Baldwin
and Krugman (1989), several prior studies have used a simple binary choice model
of whether or not to export to test for the existence of barriers to entry in foreign
markets.8 Here, we use this approach to get a sense of how these costs have changed
over time. The basic premise of the model is that a plant will sell abroad if the
benefits from exporting exceed the additional costs of doing so. The benefits include
the extra gross revenues that it could make as well as any option value associated
with being an exporter in the future. In addition to the extra expenses associated
with increased production, the costs include barriers to entry for plants that did not
export previously. Specifically, a plant that has not exported for more than two years
8See Roberts and Tybout (1997b), Bernard and Wagner (2001), and Bernard and Jensen (2004a).
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must pay a sunk cost F0 to enter the foreign market and a re-entry cost FR if it last
exported two years ago.9 The model can be reduced to a simple decision rule where
yit =

1 if p∗it − F0 + F0 · yit−1 + (F0 − FR) · ỹit−2 ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(3.1)
Here yit is plant i
′s export status in year t and ỹit−2 = yit−2 (1− yit−1) is an indicator
function for whether the plant last exported two years prior to year t. The term p∗it
can be written as
p∗it = pit + δ (Et [Vit+1 | yit = 1]− Et [Vit+1 | yit = 0])
It is determined by the extra gross profit that the plant could make by exporting this
year pit plus the option value associated with being an exporter next period. This
option value, in turn, is given by the difference in the discounted future expected value
of being an exporter today relative to only selling domestically. In the model if there
are no costs to entering the foreign market, the condition for exporting in equation
(3.1) collapses to pit ≥ 0. In this case, the plant decides whether or not to export
based solely on what is most profitable today and ignores dynamic considerations.
Thus, once controlling for factors that account for changes in pit, if there are no costs
to entering foreign markets we should see a lack of state dependence in exporting
status.
To obtain an estimating equation that will allow us to look at changes in F0 and
FR we need to parameterize p
∗
it − F0. A number of factors likely influence this term,
such as changes in plant productivity and fluctuations in foreign income. We use the
9Prior studies have found little difference between the costs of entering foreign markets anew and
entering after three years of not exporting. They have also found a small difference between F0 and
FR above. The model can be extended to include a cost of exiting L, which makes the coefficient
α1 in equation (3.2) a function of F0 +L. We think these costs are likely to be small. See Heckman




p∗it − F0 ≈ µi +X ′itβ + φt + εit
to develop the specification
yit = µi +X
′
itβ + α1 · yit−1 + α2 · ỹit−2 + φt + εit (3.2)
This equation provides the basis for our estimations. The vector Xit contains a
number of covariates that predict export market participation. These include the ratio
of nonproduction to total employment, an indicator function for change of product
and the logarithms of employment, total factor productivity, and average wages.
Productivity is estimated with the approach of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). We also
include an industry-level trade-weighted exchange rate series.10 Unobserved plant
specific factors that influence p∗it are captured in the term µi. Business cycle effects and
other time varying factors are absorbed into the year fixed effects φt. The coefficients
α1 = F0 and α2 = (F0 − FR) parameterize the importance of barriers to entry in
foreign markets. Larger estimates of α1, for example, suggest higher sunk costs F0.
Table 3.6 presents the results from estimating the specification in (3.2) over the
period 1989-2003. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the plant level
and plant-specific characteristics in Xit are lagged by one period in order to avoid
issues of simultaneity. Column (1) presents our baseline results. We include terms
that interact the variables yit−1 and ỹit−2 with an indicator function for the post-
1995 period Post95. The coefficient estimates on these interaction terms indicate how
the costs F0 and FR compare in the second half of the period to those in the first.
We find a small decline for the coefficient α1 in the second part of the panel and a
10Each exchange rate is a geometric export-weighted average of bilateral real exchange rates where
the weights are constructed using 3 digit SIC export data. We follow the aggregation method used
by the U.S. Federal Reserve, as detailed in Loretan (2005). We use the same industry-level exchange
rate series for both our reduced form estimations and structural analysis.
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somewhat larger decrease in α2. Controlling for other factors, exporting last year
raises a plant’s probability of exporting by 44% over the period 1989-1995 and by
40% over 1996-2003. These results suggest a relatively small decline in the cost F0
and an increase in the costs of re-entering foreign markets FR. The size of each of
these coefficients, however, suggests that the changes in these costs are unlikely to
have been significant enough to have played a determinative role in the large export
participation increase. In column (2) we consider the same approach as in column
(1) but drop several plant-specific covariates. The comparable results suggest that
our baseline estimations do a good job accounting for the plant heterogeneity and
time-varying factors that drive differences in p∗it across plants and time.
In our estimations in columns (1) and (2) we allow entry into the sample but drop
plants that died during the sample period. This approach allows us to abstract from
plant death, which is not explicitly a part of the model. We present the results from
alternatively considering a fully balanced panel with no entry or exit into the sample
over the 1989-2003 period in column (3). We find similar estimates to those shown in
columns (1) and (2). This is reassuring not only for the validity of our reduced form
approach but also for our structural estimations, where the model constrains us to
use a balanced panel of observations. We also considered a sample that contained no
restrictions in terms of entry and exit into the sample. We find similar results with
this sample definition as well.
In column (4) we estimate our baseline specification on a sample limited to plants
in the industries that we consider for our structural analyses. These industries are
the Preserved Fruits and Vegetables (SIC 203), Metal Forgings and Stampings (SIC
346), Aircraft and Parts (SIC 372), and Measuring and Controlling Devices (SIC 382)
industries. We discuss how these sectors were chosen in Section 3.4. Due to concerns
about disclosure, we pool the plants from different industries and consider a panel in
which both entry and exit are allowed. We find similar results to the overall trend for
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these industries. Both the magnitudes and changes in the coefficients α1 and α2 are
similar to those found in columns (1)− (3). These results suggest that the industries
that we consider for our structural analyses are representative of aggregate trends.
In addition to the results presented in Table 3.6, we come to similar conclusions
when considering alternative approaches to our baseline specification. These include
using different definitions of the post-period indicator function Post, only considering
plants with 350 or more employees, dropping the computer and semiconductor indus-
tries, using current values of plant-specific characteristics in the vector Xit, adding the
variable “Last exported three years ago” and its interaction with Post95, and limiting
the analysis to single-plant firms.11 This last robustness check is especially reassuring
as it alleviates concerns related to multi-plant firms. Standard errors are similar when
clustering by firm or by industry at the 3 digit SIC level. The estimations using a
balanced panel were also robust to these alternative estimation approaches.
3.4 Structural Estimation
3.4.1 Model
In this section, we turn to a structural approach to address how the costs of
entering foreign markets have evolved. The extra structure afforded by the model
allows us to provide numerical estimates of the costs of entering foreign markets in
different time periods. Specifically, we use the estimation methodology developed
by Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) to look at the average level of foreign market
entry costs facing plants over the 1987-1997 and 1992-2003 periods. Comparing these
cost estimates across the two panels will then give us a sense of how they have
changed. In addition to addressing the question of the determinants of the rise in
11Specifically we alternately considered defining the post period as the years after 1993, 1994,
1996 or 1997. We define the computer and semiconductor industries as the SIC87 sector codes 357
and 3674 over 1987-1997 and the NAICS sector code 334 over 1997-2003.
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export intensity, our results contribute to the emerging literature on estimating the
magnitude of these barriers. Indeed, these costs have not been estimated with panel
data outside of Colombia and Chile.
Here we lay out the basics of the model underlying the estimation approach;
further details are contained in the appendix. All plants in the model serve the
domestic market and face the choice of whether or not to sell their goods abroad.
The foreign and domestic markets are segmented from one another and are both
monopolistically competitive. We abstract from entry and exit into production in
the domestic market, requiring the use of a balanced panel in our estimations. We
assume that plants’ marginal costs do not respond to output shocks, simplifying the
model significantly by isolating the decision to serve foreign markets from domestic
concerns. Plants are forward-looking in the sense that, although they do not know
what their future realizations of marginal costs, foreign demand, and the exchange
rate will be, they know the Markov processes by which these factors evolve and set
their expectations accordingly.
The log potential profits from selling in the foreign market π∗it for plant i in year
t is defined as
ln (π∗it) = ψ0zi + ψ1et + vit (3.3)
where zi indexes time-invariant plant characteristics including a constant and et is the
exchange rate. vit is a stationary, serially correlated disturbance term that captures
shifts in factors that determine potential export profits. Examples of these factors
include changes in productivity, factor input prices, tariffs, transportation costs, and
demand. Although this general form is quite parsimonious, it allows for significant
flexibility in accounting for many of the other potential explanations for changes
in export status. We assume that vit is the sum of m stationary and independent
AR(1) processes. Formally, we have vit =
∑m
j=1 xjit where i indexes plants, t the
time period, and j the type of potential shock. Each of these potential shocks can
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be written xjit = λ
j
xxjit + wxjt, where wxjt is normally distributed with mean zero
and variance σ2wj. The composite term vit therefore follows an ARMA (m,m− 1)
process. The exchange rate et follows the AR(1) process et = λ0 +λeet−1 +wet where
wet is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ
2
w. The parameters λ0, λe,
σw and the distribution of wet are known to all plants. For ease of exposition, we
denote Ψ = (ψ01, ..., ψ0k, ψ1) = (ψ0, ψ1) and collect the parameters λ
j
x and σwj into
the diagonal matrices Λx and
∑
ω.
The relevant variable for the empirical analysis of a plant’s decision of whether or
not to export is the level of foreign profits that it could make. Our data, however,
only contain information on total revenues and export revenues. In order to make
estimation possible we draw upon two aspects of the model mentioned above: first,
markets are monopolistically competitive, and second, foreign and domestic markets
are segmented. We further denote cit as the marginal cost of production, ηi > 1 as
a plant-specific foreign demand elasticity, and P fit as the domestic currency price of







. This implies that potential foreign revenues Rf∗it and variable
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which is the standard relationship between gross profit and revenue under monop-







= ln (ηi) + ψ0zi + ψ1et + vit (3.5)
This relationship provides a way to estimate the parameters that determine export
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profits and allows us to account for a significant amount of plant heterogeneity in
our estimations to follow. It does, however, create an incidental parameters problem
with the introduction of the parameters η = {ηi}ni=1. As the number of plants in the
sample grows, so too does the number of parameters.
To solve this problem we explicitly use data on costs and revenues. This informa-
tion can be used to identify η. We begin by assuming that the ratio of foreign demand
elasticities to domestic demand elasticities is 1 + υ for all plants in the industry. By
steps analogous to those used to derive (4), profit maximization and segmented mar-




1− η−1i [1 + υ]
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in the domestic market.
Combining this with (4) and invoking the assumption of segmented markets, opti-
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(3.6)
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Here Rdit, Rit, and Cit are the plant’s realized domestic revenue, total revenue, and
total variable cost. We assume that the error term ξit comes from measurement error
in the costs Cit and follows the AR(1) process ξit = λξξit−1+wςt, where wςt is normally










The equation (3.3) gives us an expression for the baseline level of profits that plants
earn from foreign markets in each period. In looking at the plant’s dynamic problem of
whether or not to export, we further allow each plant to receive a shock to profits each
period of κ+ ε1it. κ is common to all plants and ε1it is allowed to vary across plants
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i and years t. Plants must also pay an up-front, sunk cost to enter foreign markets
γszi+ε2it−ε1it. These one-time costs γs depend on time invariant plant characteristics
zi, are paid fully in the first year of exporting, and are allowed to vary across plants
and time. Examples of these costs include market research, setting up distribution
channels, learning about foreign regulations and documentation requirements, and a
number of other non-tariff barriers. We are most interested in the parameters γs.
Note that γs parameterizes the typical costs that plants face and not necessarily the
costs that are paid by plants that begin to sell abroad. Indeed, all else equal, the
plants that enter are those that are likely to have drawn a favorable shock of ε2it−ε1it.
We assume that εjit are serially uncorrelated, normally distributed with mean zero
and variance σ2εj, and are uncorrelated with vit and et for each j = 1, 2. For the sake
of exposition, we let
∑
ε = diag (ε1it, ε2it) and Γ = (γs1, γs2, ..., γsk, κ) = (γs, κ). We
also define xit as the m × 1 vector of shocks to variable profits so vit = ι′xit where ι
is a vector of ones.
We are now in a position to describe the plant’s decision of whether or not to
export. Let yit be an indicator variable for whether plant i exported in year t. Using
the expression for gross potential export profits π∗it from (3), we can write
u (·) =

π∗it (et, xit, zi) + κ+ ε1it if yit = 1 and yit−1 = 1
π∗it (et, xit, zi) + κ− γszi + ε2it if yit = 1 and yit−1 = 0
0 if yit = 0
(3.8)
The plant’s potential net export profits depend on its prior export status, since we
assume that sunk costs have to be paid if the plant did not export in the previous
year.
In each period t, the plant observes the state variables et, xit, zi, εjit, and yit−1
and forms its expectations about the future using the fact that it knows the processes
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by which these terms evolve. The plant then determines the decision rule of whether
or not to export yit = y (et, xit, zi, εjit, yit−1 | θ) which maximizes its net discounted
expected profit stream over a 30 year horizon. Formally, we have the Bellman equation
Vit = max
yit∈{0,1}









Vit+1 · fe (e′ | et, θ) · fx (x′ | xt, θ) · fε (ε′ | εt, θ) dε′dx′de′
and θ collects all the parameters
θ = (Ψ, η, υ,Λx,Σω,Γ,Σε, λ0, λe, σw, λξ, σς)
The decision rule of whether or not to export implied by this Bellman can be
written as a binary choice problem yit = I (y
∗
it > 0). Here I (·) is an indicator function
and y∗it is a comparison of the benefits from exporting and from not exporting
y∗it = u (et, xit, zi, εit, 1, yit−1 | θ) + δ∆EtVit+1 (et, xit, zi | θ) (3.10)
where
∆EtVit+1 (et, xit, zi | θ) = Et [Vit+1 | yit = 1]− Et [Vit+1 | yit = 0]
The first term in (3.10) reflects the direct benefits today from exporting, whereas the
second term reflects the option value of being an exporter tomorrow.
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3.4.2 Estimation
Using the expressions developed above to describe a plant’s intensive and extensive
margin exporting decisions, we then develop a likelihood function that allows us to
estimate the parameters in one step















i0 | eT0 , zi, θ
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(3.11)













i0 | eT0 , zi, θ
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is formed from the
relationships implied by the extensive margin decision in (8). We provide more details




i0 | eT0 , zi, θ
)
in the appendix. Estimating the like-
lihood function L (D | θ) with classical methods presents two problems. First, while
allowing each plant to face its own demand elasticity controls for a significant amount
of plant heterogeneity, it also presents us with an incidental parameters problem in
that we need to estimate η = {ηi}ni=1. To add to this, the likelihood function is highly
non-standard and unlikely to be globally concave in θ. To circumvent these issues,
we use a Bayesian approach and write the posterior distribution of the parameters
with P (θ | D) ∝ q (θ)L (D | θ) , where q (θ) gives our prior beliefs about the param-
eters. To characterize the posterior distribution P (θ | D), we then use the random
walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. This algorithm essentially allows us to estimate
E (θ | D) by performing Monte Carlo integration using a Markov chain.
Computational constraints place some restrictions on the level of heterogeneity for
which these estimates can account. To characterize the time invariant plant charac-
teristics that affect sunk costs and export profits, we let zi equal an indicator function
based on plant size. The threshold for zi is set to be equal to the median level of sales
in 1987, such that half of the plants are considered large in the first panel for each in-
dustry. We keep this threshold for the second panel, capturing changes in plant sales
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over time. The number of AR(1) processes additively included in the profit function
disturbance term is set to two so vit = ι
′xit = x1it+x2it. Among other interpretations,
these two shocks capture cost and demand shock processes that can evolve indepen-
dently. We set the discount rate δ to 0.9. In order to ease computational costs, we
do not estimate the parameters for the exchange rate process simultaneously with
the rest of the model. Instead, we estimate them separately using export-weighted
industry real exchange rates constructed with the same approach as those described
in Section 3.3. We fit each of these series to an AR(1) process from 1972 until the
last year of each panel to give estimates of λ̂0, λ̂e, and σ̂w. These parameters are then
treated as fixed for the purposes of the estimation of the model.
For the rest of our parameters, we have to specify a prior distribution. With a
few exceptions, we make these distributions reasonably diffuse to let the data speak
for itself. To impose non-negativity on the variance parameters, our priors are that
they are distributed log normally with a mean of zero and a variance of 2. Our priors
on the root of each AR(1) process are that they are distributed uniformly on (−1, 1).
This ensures that these processes are stationary. We also set a more restrictive prior
for ηi due to the incidental parameters problem. Following the empirical literature,
we set the prior such that ln (ηi − 1) ∼ N (2, 1). This implies a mean and standard
deviation for ηi of 12.2 and 16.0, respectively. It also ensures that ηi > 1, which is
a necessary condition for the model. The prior for υ, the parameter that determines
the ratio of foreign and domestic demand elasticities, is also assumed to be uniform
on [−5, 5]. The priors for other parameters are given in Table 3.6.
Given these preliminaries, it is possible to provide intuition about the main sources
of variation used to identify the sunk cost parameters. First note that for any type
of plant the probability of exporting is an increasing function of the gross potential
profit stream that it could earn in foreign markets. If there are no barriers to entry,
the probability that a plant exports today should not depend on whether it exported
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yesterday. Plants with similar gross potential profit streams should have the same
probability of exporting regardless of their exporting history. If there are significant
up-front costs, however, plants that previously exported should have a higher proba-
bility of exporting than previously non-exporting plants since they do not need to pay
the sunk cost to export. The higher these costs are, the bigger should be the difference
between the export probabilities of plants that exported previously and those that
did not. Thus, differences in the exporting frequencies of plants with similar gross
potential export profit streams but different exporting histories in our data provide
significant identifying variance for the sunk cost parameters.
3.4.3 Results
In choosing the industries that we focused on, we used several criteria to narrow
down our choices (i) there were enough plants in each panel to allow for identification
(ii) the industry was sufficiently export oriented (iii) it did not experience large,
idiosyncratic shocks that would make our results unrepresentative (iv) like aggregate
exports, the overall destination composition of industry exports was relatively stable
and (v) the industries were in different 2 digit SIC sectors in order to get a broad
view.12 As mentioned above, these criteria led us to consider four 1987 SIC industries:
Preserved Fruits and Vegetables (SIC 203), Metal Forgings and Stampings (SIC 346),
Aircraft and Parts (SIC 372), and Measuring and Controlling Devices (SIC 382).
Table 3.13 lists the 4 digit subindustries that comprise these 3 digit sectors. We use
two panels, 1987-1997 and 1992-2003, and estimate the level of sunk costs γs in each
period.
Tables 3.8-3.12 present the results. In Table 3.8 we present the estimates for our
main sunk cost parameters by industry. All figures are in 1987 dollars. Tables 3.9
12Due to data constraints, we are limited in considering a model with only two countries. This
assumption has advantages as well as drawbacks. This noted, we limit our structural analyses
to industries where the destination of industry exports have remained stable over time by region.
Considering a number of industries further alleviates concerns related to this modeling choice.
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-3.12 present the full estimation results for each industry and time period. For each
parameter we report the estimated mean and standard deviation, although median
values give similar results. For each panel we consider 50k draws from the poste-
rior distribution to construct our estimates.13 Despite generally using highly diffuse
prior distributions, the posterior distributions for most of our parameters are fairly
concentrated. This suggests that the estimates are primarily informed by the data
itself rather than the values that we chose for our priors. We looked at the results
from several different levels of thinning the chain. Here we alternately constructed
our estimates by dropping every 2nd, 5th, 10th, 50th, or 100th draw. This standard
robustness check for Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) methods is often used to
diagnose a lack of convergence of the chain to the posterior distribution P (θ | D)
or slow movement of the chain across the parameter space (”slow mixing”). These
different levels of thinning all give comparable results.
Consistent with the small changes that we see in the reduced form estimations,
we generally find comparable results for γs across the two different time periods. The
Aircraft and Parts (SIC 372) and Measuring and Controlling Devices (SIC 382) in-
dustries experienced little change in the costs that they faced while the Preserved
Fruits and Vegetables (SIC 203) sector experienced a decrease and the Metal Forg-
ings and Stampings (SIC 346) industry saw a rise in the costs. Using the elasticity
estimates for each plant suggests that the magnitude of the sunk costs are equal to
a few years of the average level of exporting profits. Interestingly, we find similar
estimates for γs for larger and smaller plants across each of the panels. These results
suggest that differences in plant size do not alter the costs that plants face in our
samples. Elasticity estimates are also consistent with the values suggested by the
literature. In concert with our estimates from Section 3.3, we interpret these results
13Acceptance rates are kept within the range suggested by the literature and we use a burn-
in period of at least 50k iterations. We looked at a number of diagnostic statistics to check for
convergence. These tests are reviewed at length in Brooks and Roberts (1998). See the appendix
for further details about the MCMC estimation methods.
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to suggest that declines in these costs are unlikely to have been a major factor for
the level of entry that we see in the data.
One interesting aspect of our results is that we find that the costs increased over
time for the Metal Forgings and Stampings (SIC 346) industry. There are a num-
ber of factors that may have acted to raise the costs for this industry as well as
kept the barriers to entry for other industries higher than they otherwise would have
been. In what little survey evidence we have on these costs, firms list market research
and redesigning their products for foreign markets as two of the primary costs that
they face in beginning to sell abroad.14 With the increasing integration of the world
economy, market research costs may have increased substantially due to the need to
identify and study competition from a greatly expanded number of source countries.
Secondly, while most types of nontariff barriers have decreased in the last 25 years,
technical barriers to trade have increased significantly. These include product spec-
ification, testing, and information disclosure requirements. These changes are seen
in the data on nontariff barriers as well as in the rising concerns of policy makers in
recent years. It is also consistent with the idea of ”regulatory protectionism” that
has been the subject of significant prior research. Table 3.14 presents results from
a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2005) report that argues
that these barriers to trade have expanded significantly over time. Finally, as the use
of antidumping measures have grown significantly, the costs of developing an optimal
strategy for entering foreign markets may have increased due to the need to spend
more on market research and legal fees.15 While beyond the scope of this study, we
consider the effects of these factors to be an open area for future research.
14See the study conducted for the World Bank by First Washington Associates (1991).
15For evidence on changes in the technical barriers to trade, see UNCTAD (2005), Henson and
Wilson (2005), USTR (2011), U.S. Department of Commerce (2004), Maskus, Wilson, and Otsuki
(2000), and Beghin (2008). Baldwin (2000) and Sykes (1999) provide discussions of regulatory
protectionism and Blonigen and Prusa (2008) and Finger, Ng, and Wangchuk (2001) document the
rise in antidumping cases.
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3.5 Discussion
In this section we perform back-of-the-envelope calculations to better understand
the determinants of the increase in the percentage of plants that export. With 21%
exporting in 1987 and 35% in 2003 the fraction of plants that export rose by 67%
over the period. Our intent is to investigate whether a standard model can match
this rise without changes in the costs of entering foreign markets. This exercise will
give us a sense of whether or not our estimates are reasonable. We find that the
model can easily account for the patterns that we see in the data using standard
calibrations of the parameters. Here we provide one particular accounting, although
other approaches are also sufficient to match the data. We consider a two-country
version of the model of Chaney (2008) and assume as he does that the distribution of
productivity is Pareto. Given this distribution, the model implied fraction of plants
that export in each period can be written as
P
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Here φp is the minimum level of productivity φ needed to produce which we will
assume is stable φ87p = φ
03
p . φx is the threshold level needed to access foreign markets








If we divide the expression in (3.13) by that in (3.12) and use the exporting



























The parameter τij > 1 is the level of iceberg transportation costs, wi is the home
country wage, Pj is the foreign price index, fx is the cost of entering the foreign
market, and Yj is the level of foreign income. From the ASM, we know that real




is also stable or declining over the period. As
discussed by several authors, with the exception of NAFTA, tariffs on U.S. goods
also did not change significantly over the period; they were in general quite low and
stayed that way. Hummels (2007) in turn notes modest reductions in the ad valorem
air and ocean freight rates on U.S. goods over 1987-2003. Using a gravity equation
framework that accounts for other important factors besides tariffs and transportation
costs, Jacks, Meissner, and Novy (2008) also find little change in τij for the U.S.
1987-2000. Debaere and Mostashari (2010) further look at imports into the U.S. over
1989-1999 and argue that changes in τij have played a minor role in explaining the
large changes in the range of goods imported into the U.S. This was due to both the
small estimated effects of variable trade costs on the extensive margin of trade as well
as the small changes in U.S. protection over the period. 16
Motivated by this empirical evidence as well as our estimations above, we consider















stayed constant. Our work above further allows us to
reasonably assume that f 03x = f
87
x . After all these assumptions, (3.14) simplifies to
16Others, however, have argued for a larger effect of changes in variable trade costs on exports. See
Yi (2003), Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006), and Cuñat and Maffezzoli (2007). For evidence of
changes in wages in U.S. manufacturing, see the figures in the Annual Survey of Manufacturers-based











The exponent θ/(σ− 1) has been carefully estimated to be near unity and we will
use the value of 1.06 from Axtell (2001) but any choice greater than one will give
the same result. Using trade shares from 1987 as weights, we calculate a rise in real
foreign income amongst 40 top U.S. export destinations of 67%.17 Using this increase
and θ/(σ − 1) = 1.06 in equation (3.15) yields
frac03
frac87
= 1.671.06 = 1.72
The model predicts the fraction of plants that export would increase by 72% solely
due to the observed growth of foreign incomes. We highlight the fact that growth is
sufficient to explain the entire 67% increase in foreign market participation as mea-
sured in the micro data. This significant role for foreign income is consistent with
the pervasive nature of these trends for all industries and U.S. regions. Furthermore,
it is compatible with empirical evidence from Baier and Bergstrand (2001), Jacks,
Meissner, and Novy (2011), and Whalley and Xin (2011) who study the factors that
drove aggregate worldwide exports since the 1950s.18 Alternative assumptions that
increases in wi/Pj were cancelled by the modest declines in τij would give us sim-
ilar results. Finally, participation could be expected to increase even more if the
minimum productivity to produce increased φ03p > φ
87
p , iceberg costs decreased, U.S.
competitiveness deteriorated, or and this is our main point, if entry costs fell.
17We include the top 42 U.S. export destinations in 1987 with the exception of Taiwan and Kuwait
due to missing data. We consider changes in real foreign income and the real level of entry costs fx
due to units cancelling in the expression in parentheses in equation (3.15).
18For example Whalley and Xin (2011) use a calibrated trade model and find a 76% role for
income growth in the factors that drove world trade 1975-2004. Baier and Bergstrand (2001) and
Jacks Meissner, and Novy (2011) instead consider estimations based on the gravity equation and
find similar results. They study the periods 1958-1988 and 1950-2000, respectively. As each of these
papers study bilateral trade flows, however, these results do not distinguish between the roles of
domestic productivity growth and foreign income growth in driving exports from a given country.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this study we have documented a significant shift towards exporting for U.S.
plants over 1987-2006. A greater fraction of plants located in all regions and in all
sectors export in 2003 than did in 1987. We also emphasize that the extensive mar-
gin matters for trade volumes over longer horizons. In looking at why participation
increased we considered a natural explanation that has been suggested as a primary
cause for similar trends in other countries: declines in the up-front costs of entering
foreign markets. Simple descriptive statistics show there has been no change in the
persistence of export status providing first order evidence that entry costs have not
changed. The same story holds using two different estimation approaches. Our re-
duced form results show reductions in these barriers were unlikely to have played a
significant role among all manufacturing plants. And careful estimation of a micro
founded dynamic structural model that accounts for unobserved plant level hetero-
geneity gives the same result for four representative industries. Applying the new ev-
idence that entry costs were stable, we find that other factors that determine export
market participation, specifically foreign income growth, are sufficient to explain the
pervasive increase in the extensive margin. Lastly, adding to much study of changes
in variable trade barriers, our work represents an initial attempt to understand how
foreign market entry barriers have evolved over time.
We close with a discussion of a few areas of research that are likely to be fruitful
for future work. Firstly, qualitative evidence on the determinants of export market
entry costs would be tremendously valuable. Despite the evidence presented here and
their ubiquity in trade models, there is surprisingly little direct survey evidence about
these costs. Retrospective research in this area could help us better understand the
results presented above. Secondly, much of the work on understanding the effects of
free trade agreements focuses on how declines in tariffs affect aggregate trade volumes.
Total trade tends to increase through extensive margin adjustments following these
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agreements, however, and the details of these accords often include provisions likely to
reduce barriers to entry. Disentangling these effects would significantly improve our
understanding of how different impediments affect trade and would likely yield more
accurate analyses of potential policy changes. Finally, an improved understanding of
the experiences of other countries would also provide further insight into the evolution




In this appendix we provide further details about our structural estimation ap-
proach. We begin by describing how we develop the extensive margin likelihood in
sections 8.1 and 8.2. We then describe our approach to calculating the option value as-
sociated with exporting ∆EtVit+1 (et, zi, xit | θ). A description of our Bayesian MCMC
estimation approach closes. The discussion of the model here and in the main text
follows Das, Roberts, Tybout (2007); see this paper for further details about the
model and estimation approach.
3.7.1 Extensive Margin Likelihood
For the purposes of estimation, we can connect the binary choice decision problem
laid out in the body of the text to a likelihood function that uses our data from U.S.







− ln (ηi)− ψ0 · zi − ψ1 · et | Rfit > 0
}
We can then write the export profit shock for plant i in each year t as a function of
these observed shocks and a set of m iid standard normal random variates µi such
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and the term ∆EtVit+1 (et, xit, zi | θ) in the next sec-
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tions of the appendix. The value of P
(
yTi0 | eT0 , zi, v+i
)
will be calculated using the dis-
tribution of g (µi) and Monte Carlo integration, drawing several µi from g (µi), plug-
ging into P
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Given computational constraints, we use Heckman’s (1981) solution to the initial
conditions problem, and estimate P
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Using backward induction along with Rust’s (1997) random grid algorithm, we
can calculate ∆EtVit+1 (et, xit, zi | θ) in each period. We then further use the export
market participation rule in (8) to develop the likelihood function
P
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Differences across plants and time in terms of export market participation, costs, and
foreign and domestic sales will then help pin down our parameters of interest. In
particular, variation in export market participation by firms that would earn similar
levels of profits in export markets but that are different in terms of their prior foreign
market presence will be important in identifying sunk entry costs.
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3.7.2 Density Functions for Foreign Market Profit Shocks
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vit ≡ ι′xit | Rfit > 0
}
For each plant we observe qi =
∑T
t=0 yit values of v
+
i . We first assume that
each xit process is in long-run equilibrium such that xit ∼ N
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i0 | eT0 , zi
)





. We first write xTi0 as an mT × 1 vector xTi0 = (x′i0, . . . , x′iT )
′. Given
the qi × 1 vector v+i we can write
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Here Σxx ≡ E
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and Σxv ≡ E
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xTi0 · v+i ′
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x ·Σω ·(I − Λ2x)
−1
and E (xit · vit+s) = Λ|s|x ·Σω ·(I − Λ2x)
−1
ι.
See Chow (1983) for further discussion.









Av+i +Bµi if qi > 0
Bµi if qi = 0
Here A = ΣxvΣ
−1
vv , BB = Σxx−ΣxvΣ−1vv Σ′xv, and µi is an mT×1 vector of iid standard
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normal random variables with density function g (µi) =
∏mT
j=1 φ (µij). We can use this










that are then a part of
P
(











· g (µi) · dµi
Specifically, we can then use this functional form to simulate P
(
yTi0 | eT0 , zi, v+i
)
.





and (iii) averaging over the resulting values to calculate
P
(
yTi0 | eT0 , zi, v+i
)
.
3.7.3 Calculating the Option Value ∆EtVit+1 (et, zi, xit | θ)
In obtaining an estimate of the latent value of exporting
y∗it = [u (et, zi, xit, εit, yit = 1, yit−1 | θ)− 0] + δ∆EtVit+1 (et, zi, xit | θ)
the term u (et, zi, xit, εit, yit = 1, yit−1 | θ) can be calculated using the functional forms
presented in the text. To obtain an estimate for ∆EtVit+1 (et, zi, xit | θ) we begin by
using backward induction over a 30 year time horizon to first calculate
V Oit = δEtVit+1 (et+1, xit+1, zi | yit = 0, θ)
V Eit = π (et+1, xit+1, zi, θ)− κ− γs · zi + δEtVit+1 (et+1, xit+1, zi | yit = 1, θ)
V Sit = π (et+1, xit+1, zi, θ)− κ+ δEtVit+1 (et+1, xit+1, zi | yit = 1, θ)
Here V Oit is the expected value of only selling domestically in period t, V
E
it is the
expected value from entering the foreign market, and V Sit is the expected value of
continuing to sell abroad. The algorithm begins in the last year in which EtVit+1 = 0
and then calculates V Oit , V
E
it , and V
S
it backwards successively until the current period
is reached. We use Rust’s (1997) random grid algorithm to integrate numerically over
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the state variables x and e. We calculate

















V Sit+1 + σε1 ·

















·f (xt+1 | xt) · f (et+1 | et) · dxt+1 · det+1
and



















V Eit + σε2 ·

















·f (xt+1 | xt) · f (et+1 | et) · dxt+1 · det+1
3.7.4 Monte Carlo Markov Chain Methods
We take S = 50k draws of the posterior distribution P (θ | D) to construct our
estimates using the random-walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. These draws are
taken after an initial burn-in period that allows the chain to converge to the posterior


















where θs is a given draw of the entire parameter vector from the posterior distribution.
We use a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm in which we update the different components
of the parameter vector separately in each iteration of the chain. We choose to
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partition θ with θs = (θs1, θ
s
2, . . . , θ
s
8) where θ1 = Ψ, θ2 = Λx, θ3 = Σω, θ4 = Γ,
θ5 = Σε, θ6 = η, θ7 = (υ, ρ, σξ), θ8 = ς. Once starting values for the chain are chosen,
for each iteration we perform the following steps. These steps are then repeated for
each iteration.
1. Draw a potential new value for one of the subvectors θi based on the value from







the value of the subvector from the previous iteration and υsi is a mean-zero vector
of shocks. The covariance matrix for υsi , Συi , is chosen before the estimations begin
and is held fixed throughout.
2. Define θ̃s−i as the set of parameters in θ excluding those in θ̃
s










θsi | θs−i, D
) , 1)















with probability 1− αsi
3. Conduct the same process for each block of parameters θi. Once this is done
∀ i, we take the resulting value of θ as our draw from the chain. This process is
repeated for each draw of the chain.
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Table 3.1: Export Participation by Industry
Plants that Export (%)
Industry 1987 1992 1997 2003
Food 15 23 25 27
Tobacco 45 51 47
(Beverage & Tobacco) 28
Textile Mill Products 16 25 28
(Textile Mills) 40
(Textile Product Mills) 30
Apparel 5 9 13 13
Wood products 12 18 16 16
Furniture 10 25 24 18
Paper 19 31 32 35
Printing & Publishing 5 10 11 14
Chemicals 40 49 49 55
Petroleum & Coal 22 30 30 31
Plastics & Rubber 26 36 39 40
Leather 19 28 35 38
Nonmetallic Minerals 14 21 20 17
Primary Metals 27 39 39 43
Fabricated Metals 21 31 32 30
Machinery 33 43 41 56
Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 37 46 47
(Electrical Equipment, etc.) 54
Instruments 48 55 56
(Computer & Electronic Products) 58
Transportation Equipment 29 40 41 49
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 20 34 36 37
Total 21 30 32 35
Notes: The table lists the percentage of plants that export in each industry using
the Census of Manufacturers in 1987, 1992, and 1997 and the Annual Survey of
Manufacturers in 2003. Due to concerns about disclosure, the results reported for 1987
and 1992 are from Bernard & Jensen (2004b). The classification system used is 1987
U.S. SIC for 1987-1997 and 2002 NAICS for 2003. Similar to other reported figures,
estimates are for plants with 20 or more employees. While somewhat heterogeneous
in size and timepaths, these results overall suggest that the trends pictured in Figure
3.1 were pervasive across industries. See also Figure 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Export Participation by Region
Plants that Export (%)
Region 1987 1992 1997 2003
New England 25 37 37 42
Middle Atlantic 19 29 30 34
East North Central 25 34 35 39
West North Central 23 32 33 37
South Atlantic 18 27 29 32
East South Central 18 27 27 30
West South Central 19 28 28 31
Mountain 18 26 27 32
Pacific 21 31 31 33
Total 21 30 32 35
Notes: The table lists the percentage of plants that export in each U.S. Census
geographical division using the Census of Manufacturers in 1987, 1992, and 1997 and
the Annual Survey of Manufacturers in 2003. We report the states corresponding to
these divisions in Table 3.3. Similar to other reported figures, estimates are for plants
with 20 or more employees. These results suggest the time path of participation rates
of each region match the overall trend across these years. Furthermore, these trends
also hold across the 50 states. See also Figure 3.3 and Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3: Census Division of the States
Census Division State Census Division State





Vermont West South Central Arkansas
Louisiana


























Notes: The table lists the states corresponding to the Census Divisions used for our
calculations in Figure 3.3 and table 3.2.
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Table 3.4: Destinations of U.S. Manufacturing Exports















Hong Kong 1.7 1.7
Venezuela 1.6 .3
Spain 1.4 .9




Notes: The table lists the destination composition of U.S. manufacturing exports by
value in 1987 and 2003. Thus, Germany accounted for 5.4% of total U.S. exports in
1987 and 5.8% in 2003. Calculations are done using the UN Commodity Trade and
Statistics Database. We present the share for the top 20 destinations in 1987 across
the two different years. These countries account for 81.7% of U.S. exports in 1987 and
79.4% in 2003. These figures demonstrate that the composition has remained stable
over time. Shares come even closer when excluding Mexico from the analysis. Indeed,
the rank correlation amongst the top 40 destinations in 1987 with their respective
ordering in 2003 is 88%.
90
Table 3.5: Intensive Margin
Starting
Continuing 1987 1992 1997 2002
1987 1
1992 0.75 1
1997 0.58 0.79 1
2002 0.46 0.58 0.71 1
Notes: The table lists the percentage of exports in each Census of Manufacturers
(CMF) year that came from plants that exported in each of the previous Census years,
starting in 1987. Thus only 46% of exports in 2002 came from plants that exported
in 1987, 1992, and 1997. Removing any continuous exporting restriction, we find that
57% of trade in 2002 is from plants that export in both 1987 and 2002. Similar to
our other figures, estimations are limited to plants with 20 or more employees.
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Table 3.6: Determinants of Export Status
Specification
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Exported last year .444** .445** .456** .385**
(.008) (.008) (.009) (.028)
Exported last year * Post95 -.044** -.044** -.034** -.032
(.006) (.006) (.007) (.022)
Last exported two years ago .153** .154** .161** .123**
(.013) (.013) (.013) (.041)
Last exported two years ago * Post95 -.094** -.094** -.092** -.076
(.016) (.016) (.017) (.051)
Total Employment -.002 -.007 .039
(.012) .013 (.040)
Wages .025** .031** .030
(.012) .013 (.039)
Non-production/Total Employment -.059** -.052** -.142**
(.022) .024 (.066)
Changed Product .001 .001 -.028
(.009) .011 (.028)
Productivity .006** .007** .009** .014
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.009)
Industry Exchange Rate .028 .034 .041 -.023
(.039) (.040) (.043) (.151)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Overall R2 .508 .507 .514 .434
Observations 65388 65388 54947 6089
Notes: The table presents the results from estimating equation (2) in the text. The
dependent variable is a 0/1 indicator for a given plant’s export status in the current
year. Standard errors are clustered at the plant level and non-exporting related plant-
specific characteristics are lagged by one period in all specifications. The coefficient
“Exported last year” is an increasing function of the costs of entering foreign markets
anew F0. The coefficient on “Last exported two years ago” is similarly an increasing
function of the difference F0−FR, where FR is the cost of re-entering foreign markets
after leaving the foreign market one year ago. Post95 is an indicator function for the
post-1995 part of the sample. The results suggest a modest decline in F0 and an
increase in FR. Column (1) presents the results from our baseline specification and
column (2) considers a similar approach that drops a number of covariates. Column
(3) reports results from using a balanced panel. Column (4) restricts the sample to
plants in the industries we considered for our structural analysis. ∗∗ denotes signifi-
cance at the 5% level.
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Table 3.7: Prior Distributions
Parameters Priors N(µ, σ)
Profits
ψ01 (intercept) ψ01 ∼ N(0, 10)
ψ02 (dom. size dummy) ψ02 ∼ N(0, 10)
ψ1 (exchange rate) ψ1 ∼ N(0, 10)
λ1x (root, first AR) λ
1
x ∼ U(−1, 1)
λ2x (root, second AR) λ
2
x ∼ U(−1, 1)
σ2ω1 (variance, first AR) ln(σ
2
ω1) ∼ N(0, 20)
σ2ω2 (variance, second AR) ln(σ
2
ω2) ∼ N(0, 20)
υ (foreign elas. premium) υ ∼ U [−5, 5]
λξ (root, measurement error) λξ ∼ U(−1, 1)
σξ (std. dev., measurement error) ln(σξ) ∼ N(0, 2)
Elasticities of Demand
ηµ (demand elas., µ across plants) ln(ηi − 1) ∼ N(2, 1)
ησ (demand elas., σ across plants)
Exporting Decision
γs1 (sunk cost, small plants) γs1 ∼ N(0, 20)
γs2 (sunk cost, large plants) γs2 ∼ N(0, 20)
κ (mean, ε1 & ε2 ) κ ∼ N(0, 20)
σε1 (st. dev., ε1) ln(σε1) ∼ N(0, 20)
σε2 (st. dev., ε2) ln(σε2) ∼ N(0, 20)
Initial Conditions
α0 (intercept) α0 ∼ N(0, 50)
α1 (dom. size dummy) α1 ∼ N(0, 50)
α2 (x1) α2 ∼ N(0, 50)
α3 (x2) α3 ∼ N(0, 50)
Notes: The table presents the priors used for our structural estimations for each
industry. The results are presented in Tables 3.8-3.12. We generally choose diffuse
priors to allow the data to speak for itself. Variance parameters have log normal
distributions to impose nonnegativity. The root of each AR (1) process is bounded
on (−1, 1) in order to ensure stationarity.
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Table 3.8: Sunk Cost Parameter Estimates
Panel
1987-1997 1992-2003
Preserved Fruits & Vegetables (203)
γs1 (sunk cost, small plants) 3.43 (0.35) 2.30 (0.21)
γs2 (sunk cost, large plants) 3.27 (0.33) 2.05 (0.22)
Metal Forgings & Stampings (346) 4.65 (0.34) 5.35 (0.92)
γs1 (sunk cost, small plants) 4.53 (0.44) 5.67 (1.05)
γs2 (sunk cost, large plants)
Aircraft & Parts (372)
γs1 (sunk cost, small plants) 2.10 (0.43) 2.22 (0.49)
γs2 (sunk cost, large plants) 2.16 (0.45) 1.99 (0.45)
Measuring & Controlling Devices (382)
γs1 (sunk cost, small plants) 2.84 (0.38) 2.50 (0.54)
γs2 (sunk cost, large plants) 2.54 (0.41) 2.63 (0.64)
Notes: The table presents the sunk cost estimates γs for each industry over the
time periods 1987-1997 and 1992-2003. Means are presented along with standard
deviations in parentheses. Median estimates give similar results. We interpret these
results as evidence against the argument that declines in the costs to entering foreign
markets have played a significant role in export trends across manufacturing as a
whole. Full results for each industry are found in Tables 3.9-3.12.
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Table 3.9: SIC 203 Posterior Parameter Distributions (Means & Std Deviations)
Preserved Fruits & Vegs. (203)
1987-1997 1992-2003
Profits
ψ01 (intercept) -2.06 (0.23) -2.06 (0.27)
ψ02 (dom. size dummy) 1.05 (0.30) 1.12 (0.35)
ψ1 (exchange rate) 0.37 (1.50) -0.31 (0.75)
λ1x (root, first AR) 0.13 (0.03) 0.43 (0.05)
λ2x (root, second AR) 0.71 (0.02) 0.90 (0.03)
σ2ω1 (variance, first AR) 0.04 (0.01) 0.53 (0.09)
σ2ω2 (variance, second AR) 1.36 (0.07) 0.43 (0.09)
υ (foreign elas. premium) 0.03 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04)
λξ (root, measurement error) 0.88 (0.01) 0.84 (0.02)
σξ (std. error, measurement error) 0.22 (0.03) 0.21 (0.02)
Elasticities of Demand
ηµ (demand elas., µ across plants) 13.39 (7.31) 12.68 (6.14)
ησ (demand elas., σ across plants) 11.74 (6.89) 11.78 (6.29)
Exporting Decision
γs1 (sunk cost, small plants) 3.43 (0.35) 2.30 (0.21)
γs2 (sunk cost, large plants) 3.27 (0.33) 2.05 (0.22)
κ (mean, ε1 & ε2 ) 0.16 (0.03) 0.09 (0.02)
σε1 (std. error, ε1) 1.72 (0.68) 1.42 (0.22)
σε2 (std. error, ε2) 1.31 (0.54) 0.66 (0.09)
Initial Conditions
α0 (intercept) 11.16 (10.21) 7.27 (6.87)
α1 (dom. size dummy) 28.87 (18.26) 24.06 (16.18)
α2 (x1) 46.34 (26.12) 19.36 (66.10)
α3 (x2) -71.33 (31.19) 32.73 (57.31)
Observations N = 112, T = 11 N = 101, T = 12
Notes: The table presents the results from estimating the structural model presented
in Section 3.4 for the Preserved Fruits and Vegetables industry (SIC 203) over the
time periods 1987-1997 and 1992-2003. We find that the average level of sunk costs
associated with entering foreign markets facing this industry γs declined somewhat
over the period from ∼ $3.3 million to ∼ $2.2 million. Mean estimates of foreign
demand elasticities are consistent with the findings in the literature.
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Table 3.10: SIC 346 Posterior Parameter Distributions (Means & Std Deviations)
Metal Forgings & Stampings (346)
1987-1997 1992-2003
Profits
ψ01 (intercept) -1.96 (0.29) -1.27 (0.26)
ψ02 (dom. size dummy) 2.77 (0.38) 2.49 (0.32)
ψ1 (exchange rate) 0.03 (0.59) 1.07 (0.49)
λ1x (root, first AR) 0.04 (0.28) 0.60 (0.15)
λ2x (root, second AR) 0.92 (0.02) 0.86 (0.05)
σ2ω1 (variance, first AR) 0.13 (0.07) 0.18 (0.09)
σ2ω2 (variance, second AR) 0.43 (0.08) 0.31 (0.10)
υ (foreign elas. premium) 0.12 (0.04) 0.41 (0.06)
λξ (root, measurement error) 0.82 (0.02) 0.80 (0.03)
σξ (std. error, measurement error) 0.11 (0.01) 0.13 (0.02)
Elasticities of Demand
ηµ (demand elas., µ across plants) 13.26 (6.20) 11.74 (6.84)
ησ (demand elas., σ across plants) 11.97 (6.45) 8.34 (5.30)
Exporting Decision
γs1 (sunk cost, small plants) 4.65 (0.34) 5.35 (0.92)
γs2 (sunk cost, large plants) 4.53 (0.44) 5.67 (1.05)
κ (mean, ε1 & ε2 ) 0.55 (0.10) 0.92 (0.40)
σε1 (std. error, ε1) 2.35 (0.28) 1.48 (0.54)
σε2 (std. error, ε2) 1.59 (0.47) 4.72 (1.47)
Initial Conditions
α0 (intercept) 34.90 (9.48) 38.60 (19.22)
α1 (dom. size dummy) 47.67 (4.05) 45.64 (26.12)
α2 (x1) -63.31 (5.19) 47.79 (45.07)
α3 (x2) -30.17 (7.26) -0.47 (33.91)
Observations N = 704, T = 11 N = 648, T = 12
Notes: The table presents the results from estimating the structural model presented
in Section 3.4 for the Metal Forgings and Stampings industry (SIC 346) over the
time periods 1987-1997 and 1992-2003. We find that the average level of sunk costs
associated with entering foreign markets facing this industry γs increased somewhat
over the period from ∼ $4.6 million to ∼ $5.5 million. Mean estimates of foreign
demand elasticities are consistent with the findings in the literature.
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Table 3.11: SIC 372 Posterior Parameter Distributions (Means & Std Deviations)
Aircraft & Parts (372)
1987-1997 1992-2003
Profits
ψ01 (intercept) -0.45 (0.30) -0.33 (0.35)
ψ02 (dom. size dummy) 2.52 (0.43) 2.54 (0.43)
ψ1 (exchange rate) -0.06 (1.00) 0.31 (0.49)
λ1x (root, first AR) 0.22 (0.09) 0.40 (0.08)
λ2x (root, second AR) 0.97 (0.01) 0.97 (0.01)
σ2ω1 (variance, first AR) 0.57 (0.08) 0.41 (0.05)
σ2ω2 (variance, second AR) 0.16 (0.06) 0.19 (0.04)
υ (foreign elas. premium) 1.82 (0.13) 2.40 (0.39)
λξ (root, measurement error) 0.98 (0.00) 0.98 (0.00)
σξ (std. error, measurement error) 1.14 (0.12) 1.38 (0.26)
Elasticities of Demand
ηµ (demand elas., µ across plants) 12.40 (5.44) 12.13 (4.42)
ησ (demand elas., σ across plants) 12.39 (6.10) 12.25 (5.09)
Exporting Decision
γs1 (sunk cost, small plants) 2.10 (0.43) 2.22 (0.49)
γs2 (sunk cost, large plants) 2.16 (0.45) 1.99 (0.45)
κ (mean, ε1 & ε2 ) 0.23 (0.05) 0.18 (0.05)
σε1 (std. error, ε1) 0.83 (0.36) 0.90 (0.25)
σε2 (std. error, ε2) 1.05 (0.29) 0.86 (0.16)
Initial Conditions
α0 (intercept) 50.36 (22.80) 27.68 (16.76)
α1 (dom. size dummy) 8.85 (18.06) 23.72 (19.60)
α2 (x1) -9.95 (19.15) -64.19 (26.86)
α3 (x2) -47.56 (57.80) 53.59 (25.83)
Observations N = 924, T = 11 N = 948, T = 12
Notes: The table presents the results from estimating the structural model presented
in Section 3.4 for the Aircraft and Parts industry (SIC 372) over the time periods
1987-1997 and 1992-2003. We find that the average level of sunk costs associated
with entering foreign markets facing this industry γs were relatively stable over time.
Mean estimates of foreign demand elasticities are consistent with the findings in the
literature.
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Table 3.12: SIC 382 Posterior Parameter Distributions (Means & Std Deviations)
Measuring & Controlling Devices (382)
1987-1997 1992-2003
Profits
ψ01 (intercept) -0.16 (0.17) -0.06 (0.17)
ψ02 (dom. size dummy) 0.83 (0.24) 1.47 (0.25)
ψ1 (exchange rate) -0.83 (0.62) 0.55 (0.45)
λ1x (root, first AR) 0.16 (0.17) 0.61 (0.07)
λ2x (root, second AR) 0.91 (0.03) 0.82 (0.08)
σ2ω1 (variance, first AR) 0.19 (0.06) 0.31 (0.06)
σ2ω2 (variance, second AR) 0.16 (0.05) 0.10 (0.06)
υ (foreign elas. premium) 1.36 (0.07) 2.10 (0.13)
λξ (root, measurement error) 0.98 (0.00) 0.98 (0.00)
σξ (std. error, measurement error) 0.84 (0.09) 1.11 (0.18)
Elasticities of Demand
ηµ (demand elas., µ across plants) 11.46 (6.68) 10.90 (6.68)
ησ (demand elas., σ across plants) 8.01 (5.03) 5.88 (3.84)
Exporting Decision
γs1 (sunk cost, small plants) 2.84 (0.38) 2.50 (0.54)
γs2 (sunk cost, large plants) 2.54 (0.41) 2.63 (0.64)
κ (mean, ε1 & ε2 ) 0.85 (0.33) 1.43 (0.62)
σε1 (std. error, ε1) 1.48 (0.29) 1.14 (0.51)
σε2 (std. error, ε2) 2.09 (0.81) 4.44 (1.49)
Initial Conditions
α0 (intercept) 40.80 (17.89) 51.39 (21.09)
α1 (dom. size dummy) 28.84 (25.01) -5.80 (18.55)
α2 (x1) 46.72 (24.20) 0.42 (29.67)
α3 (x2) 49.97 (40.25) 64.65 (32.81)
Observations N = 1056, T = 11 N = 828, T = 12
Notes: The table presents the results from estimating the structural model presented
in Section 3.4 for the Measuring and Controlling Devices industry (SIC 382) over
the time periods 1987-1997 and 1992-2003. We find that the average level of sunk
costs associated with entering foreign markets facing this industry γs were relatively
stable over time. Mean estimates of foreign demand elasticities are consistent with
the findings in the literature.
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Table 3.13: Four Digit Subindustries For Structural Estimations
3 Digit SIC Industry 4 Digit SIC Subindustry
Preserved Fruits and Canned specialties (2032)
Vegetables (203) Canned fruits and vegetables (2033)
Dehydrated fruits, vegetables, and soups (2034)
Pickles, sauces, and salad dressings (2035)
Frozen fruits and vegetables (2037)
Frozen specialties, n.e.c. (2038)
Metal Forgings and Iron and steel forgings (3462)
Stampings (346) Nonferrous forgings (3463)
Automotive stampings (3465)
Crowns and closures (3466)
Metal stampings, n.e.c. (3469)
Aircraft and Parts (372) Aircraft (3721)
Aircraft Engines and Engine Parts (3724)
Aircraft Parts and Equipment, N.E.C. (3728)
Measuring and Controlling Laboratory Apparatus and Furniture (3821)
Devices (382) Environmental Controls (3822)
Process Control Instruments (3823)
Fluid Meters and Counting Devices (3824)
Instruments to Measure Electricity (3825)
Analytical Instruments (3826)
Optical Instruments and Lenses (3827)
Measuring and Controlling Devices, N.E.C. (3829)
Notes: The table lists the 4 digit 1987 SIC industries that compose the 3 digit 1987
SIC industries that we consider for our structural analyses.
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Table 3.14: Evolution of Nontariff Barriers
Tariff Lines Affected (%)
Category 1994 2004
Price Control Measures 7 2
(antidumping, min import prices)
Finance Measures 2 2
(foreign exchange regs)
Automatic Licensing Measures 3 2
(prior surveillance)
Quantity Control Measures 49 35
(quotas, seasonal prohibition)
Monopolistic Measures 1 2
(sole importing agency)




Number of Countries 52 97
Number of Tariff Lines 97706 545078
Notes: The figures in the table report the percentage of types of goods (tariff lines)
that are affected by each nontariff barrier to trade. They are cited from United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2005) and support the report’s con-
tention that the technical barriers to trade have increased substantially over time.
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Figure 3.1: Percentage of U.S. Manufacturing Plants That Export
The figure graphs the percent of U.S. manufacturing plants that export in each year
1987-2003. Calculations are based on plants with 20 or more employees. Due to
concerns about disclosure, estimates for 1987 and 1992 are from Bernard and Jensen
(2004b).
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Figure 3.2: Industry Decomposition
The figure depicts the percentage of plants with 20 or more employees that export
for each industry in 1987 and 2003.
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Figure 3.3: Geographical Decomposition
The figure depicts percentage of plants with 20 or more employees that export for
each region of the US in 1987 and 2003. See Tables 3.1 and 3.2 for more details.
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Figure 3.4: Average Foreign Sales Per Exporter
The figure graphs the average level of real foreign sales per exporter by year 1987-
2003. To look at percentage changes, estimates are normalized such that the value
in 1987 equals one. Calculations are based on plants with 20 or more employees.
We exclude plants in the Computer and Semiconductor industries due to the strong
decline in prices over time. Increases in this measure are even stronger when including
these industries.
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Figure 3.5: Export Persistence, Entries, and Exits
The figure depicts the annual percent of plants that enter foreign markets, exit, or
keep the same export status (domestic or exporter). In each year, the sample is
confined to plants that existed in the prior year, such that % Entries + % Exits + %
Persist = 100%. Due to changes across ASM sampling frames these figures are limited
to plants with 250 or more employees. The exit and entry values for 1988-1992 are
from Bernard and Jensen (1999) Table 7 due to disclosure concerns.
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24. Cuñat, Alejandro, and Marco Maffezzoli, “Can Comparative Advantage Explain
the Growth of U.S. Trade?,” Economic Journal, 117 (2007), 583-602.
25. Das, Sanghamitra, Mark J. Roberts and James R. Tybout, “Market Entry
Costs, Producer Heterogeneity, and Export Dynamics,” Econometrica, 75 (2007),
837-873.
26. Debaere, Peter and Shalah Mostashari, “Do Tariffs Matter for the Extensive
Margin of International Trade? An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, 81 (2010), 163-169.
27. di Giovanni, Julian and Andrei Levchenko, “Firm Entry, Trade, and Welfare in
Zipf’s World,” Journal of International Economics, 89:2 (2013), 283-296.
28. Dixit, Avinash, “Entry and Exit Decisions Under Uncertainty” Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 97 (1989), 620-38.
107
29. Eaton, Jonathan, Samuel Kortum and Francis Kramarz, “An Anatomy of Inter-
national Trade: Evidence from French Firms” Econometrica, 79 (2011), 1453-
1498.
30. Eaton, Jonathan, Marcela Eslava, Maurice Kugler and James R. Tybout, ”Ex-
port Dynamics in Colombia: Firm-Level Evidence,” NBER Working Paper
13531, (2007).
31. Evenett, Simon J., and Anthony J. Venables, “Export Growth in Developing
Countries: Market Entry and Bilateral Trade Flows,” mimeograph, London
School of Economics, 2002.
32. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Industry-Specific Exchange Rates,” (Ac-
cessed: 2010, August 12) (2010)
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/global economy/industry specific exrates.html
33. Finger, J. Michael, Francis Ng and Sonam Wangchuk, “Antidumping as Safe-
guard Policy,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2730, 2001.
34. First Washington Associates, “Export Finance and Promotion Study:
PROEXPO/Colombia,” (Arlington, VA: 1991).
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Models of international trade featuring differentiated products rarely explicitly
include the process by which producers and consumers find one another. In this
study, we model the nature of the importing relationship using a search and matching
framework in the style of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) embedded in a general
equilibrium Melitz (2003) type heterogeneous firm model of international trade. The
search and matching friction at the heart of our model arises because it takes time and
expense for U.S. importers to find suitable foreign varieties. Search introduces a wedge
between the final domestic price and the price of the imported good but otherwise
leaves many of the standard trade results intact. In particular, the quantity traded,
the productivity threshold necessary to export, and the importing country’s price
index all remain unchanged, largely due to profit maximizing conditions that survive
the addition of search. We derive a gravity equation and show that the total value of
imports falls as search frictions rise.
A few papers have considered modeling search in trade. Specifically, Rauch (1996)
uses a partial equilibrium model of search to explain the existence of large Japanese in-
termediate general trading companies. These general trading companies pay a search
cost and then match producers and consumers without producing any goods them-
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selves. Rauch (1999) uses a gravity model and variables that proxy for the strength
of links between countries to argue that search costs in trade are higher for differen-
tiated than for homogenous products. Rauch and Trindale (2002) also use a gravity
equation to argue that populations of ethnic Chinese within a country facilitate the
flow of information, provide matching and referral services and otherwise reduce in-
formal barriers to trade. For differentiated products traded between Southeast Asian
countries Rauch and Trindale estimate that ethnic Chinese networks increase bilat-
eral trade flows by nearly 60%. Finally, Portes and Rey (1999) find that bilateral
telephone traffic and the number of bank subsidiaries improve information flow be-
tween countries, significantly increasing trade flows in a standard gravity equation
regression. One could also argue that these measures proxy for lower search costs.
Taking a more structural modeling approach Eaton, Eslava, Krizan, Kugler and
Tybout (2012) and Monarch (2013) study the relationships between U.S. importers
and their exporting partners in Columbia and China respectively. Eaton et al. (2012)
have a search and learning framework where firms learn about their ability slowly
through export experience. Monarch (2013) focuses on the tradeoff between remaining
in a current supplier relationship or paying a sunk cost to form a relationship with a
lower cost supplier.
While this paper focuses on a simple model of search and the steady-state ag-
gregate implications, viewing trading relationships through the lens of search theory
allows for a micro level analysis together with business cycle implications. In par-
ticular, U.S. firms exhibit increasingly complex linkages with foreign affiliates in the
globalized economy. It has been suggested that these linkages are important in prop-
agating business cycles internationally. Given the ability of search models to match
labor market dynamics, combining search and trade may be a way to understand the
transmission of economy-wide and idiosyncratic firm level shocks across international
borders. Recent contributions on the ability of idiosyncratic firm level shocks to
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generate aggregate fluctuations are provided by Gabaix (2011), Carvalho and Gabaix
(2010), Acemoglu et. al, (2012) and Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2009).
Among the first authors to consider both international transmission and idiosyncratic
sources of aggregate fluctuations were di Giovanni and Levchenko (2012) and di Gio-
vanni, Levchenko, and Mejean, (2012). Engel and Wang (2011) document that, like
investment, import flows are pro-cyclical and about three times as volatile as GDP.
This suggests that import fluctuations could generate fluctuations in aggregate out-
put. One could also extend a search model to deal with the fact that imports are
large and lumpy, occurring infrequently. This would involve including another state
variable (the level of the imported product stored by the importing firm) and addi-
tional value functions for being in a matched relationship but not necessarily making
a transaction in a given period. This would add search to the recent work of Alessan-
dria, Kaboski and Midrigan (2012) who argue that firms treat imports as inventory.
Given that inventories are a well known highly volatile component of output, this
might be an additional channel through which shocks are transmitted internationally.
The current framework can be extended to incorporate ideas from Elsby and
Michaels (2012), allowing the importer to contact more than one foreign producer
simultaneously. This extension would allow for a quantitative assessment of the sub-
extensive margin of trade as defined by Gopinath and Neiman (2012) at business
cycle frequencies. They show that firm participation does not account for much trade
adjustment at quarterly frequencies because entering and exiting firms are small.
However, firms’ country-product import status matters because while large firms
hardly ever change their import status they often add and drop products. The number
of products imported is highly skewed according to Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2010)
who document that at least 90% of total U.S. imports are imported by firms that
import 10 or more HS10 products. These same firms account for 21% of total U.S.
employment. The size and importance of these firms in the economy suggest that
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shocks that change the sub-extensive margin could be important at the aggregate
level.
The next section introduces the search and matching portion of the model. Section
3 embeds search into the Chaney (2008) trade model. Section 4 derives the gravity
equation implied by the combined search and trade model and the last section presents
a discussion of further research.
4.2 Modeling the search for imports
4.2.1 Value functions
The model can be summarized by the value functions in continuous time. While
we begin by framing these as dynamic choices, all analysis and solutions will be in
steady state. The value, X (ϕ), to the foreign firm with exogenous productivity, ϕ,
of exporting a product satisfies
rX (ϕ) = pq − φ (q)− λ (X (ϕ)− U (ϕ)) (4.1)
where r is the discount rate, p is the price of one unit of the exported good, q is the
quantity imported, λ is the rate at which trading relationships exogenously dissolve,
and φ(·) is an arbitrary production cost function that depends on the level of output q
as well as input prices in the foreign country.1 This equation states that the net return
from exporting must equal the flow payoff plus the capital gain from exogenously
separating and transitioning to the state of being an unmatched exporter with value
U (ϕ). We explicitly write the value as a function of the exporter’s productivity, ϕ, to
remind the reader that each term in the flow profit is a function of this productivity;
however we conserve on notation by omitting this argument in the import price and
1In the labor-macro literature the flow payoff here can be whφ(1 − h) where h is the hours of
work sold by the worker and φ′(·) > 0. That is, instantaneous utility depends on current income
and current hours of work and is nonlinear in the hours of work.
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quantity. As is standard in the trade literature, we assume that the exporter knows
their productivity, even prior to exporting, when unmatched. The value to a foreign
producer looking to export to the domestic market but not presently in a relationship,
U (ϕ), is
rU (ϕ) = κχ (κ) (X (ϕ)− U (ϕ)) (4.2)
where κχ(κ) is the rate at which foreign firms find domestic partners. Here we assume
the flow value of search is zero, though relaxing this assumption is straightforward.
This simplification implies that the value of being in a match, X (ϕ), should be
interpreted as the value in addition to the foreign firm’s operations in the foreign
market.
The value of a domestic firm being in an importing relationship, M (ϕ), is defined
by its asset equation
rM (ϕ) = pd (q) q − qp− λ (M (ϕ)− V ) (4.3)
where pd (q) is domestic demand. Equation (4.3) states that the asset value of import-
ing must yield a net return that is equal to the flow payoff from being an importer plus
the expected capital gain from exogenously separating and being left with the value,
V , of being an unmatched importer. The domestic firm does not add any value to the
product and could be viewed as a final consumer who searches for a good to consume.
Alternatively, the domestic firm is a simple wholesaler, purchasing foreign products
and passing them on to domestic consumers. We start with a general demand curve,
pd (q), which is known to the firm, and later we choose a specific functional form. We
also assume that the matched importing firm knows the productivity of the foreign
exporter with which they are matched. In this sense, matches are inspection goods
or search goods, as opposed to experience goods.
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The value of being an unmatched importer, V , satisfies
rV = −c+ χ (κ)
∫
[max {V,M (ϕ)} − V ] dG (ϕ) (4.4)
where c is the flow cost of looking for a foreign affiliate, and χ (κ) stands for the
finding rate for the importer. Notice that V is not a function of the exporting firm’s
productivity, ϕ, but rather a function of the expected productivity with which the
importer might match. When the importer meets an exporter with productivity ϕ,
it chooses between matching with this exporter and continuing its search. Prior to
being in a match, the importing firm does not know which exporter it will meet, and
hence uses the expectation over all productivities it might meet in its continuation
value. In equilibrium, the importer always finds it beneficial to consummate matches
since the only exporters that find it worthwhile to export have productivities that
result in M (ϕ) ≥ 0. We assume that χ′ (κ) ≤ 0 where κ can be viewed as a measure
of the difficulty of finding an import partner. A higher κ implies it is more difficult
to find a match and so the finding rate for importers will be lower. We will make the
assumption of free entry into being an unmatched importer so that in equilibrium the
value of being an unmatched importer, V , is driven to zero.
The domestic importer and foreign exporter Nash bargain over import price and
quantity which is equivalent to maximizing the following Nash product
max
q,p
[X (ϕ)− U (ϕ)]β [M (ϕ)− V ]1−β , 0 ≤ β < 1 (4.5)
where β is the foreign exporter’s bargaining power.2
2Notice that equations (4.3), (4.4) and (4.15) together with β = 1 imply that for productivity
levels ϕ above the reservation productivity level, ϕ̄ (see discussion below equation 4.11), the domestic
firm has no incentive to be a matched importer. We avoid this extreme case by assuming β strictly
less than one.
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4.2.2 Solution to the search model
For this section, it will be helpful to note that equations (4.1) and (4.3) imply
that
X (ϕ) =





pd (q) q − pq
r + λ
(4.7)
4.2.2.1 FOC w.r.t. p




X (ϕ)− U (ϕ)
− (1− β) 1
M (ϕ)− V
= 0 (4.8)
which implies the simple surplus sharing rule: the foreign firm receives β of the total
surplus from the trading relationship, M (ϕ)−V +X (ϕ)−U (ϕ). The domestic firm
receives the rest of the surplus. We do not need to calculate the partial with respect
to U (ϕ) or V (ϕ) because the individual firms are too small to influence the market.
Hence, when they meet, the firms bargain over the import price taking behavior in
the rest of the market as given. In particular, the outside option of the firms does
not vary with the individual’s bargaining problem.
4.2.2.2 FOC w.r.t. q
Take equation (4.5), log and differentiate with respect to the quantity q to get
β
1
X (ϕ)− U (ϕ)
(p− φ′(q)) + (1− β) 1
M (ϕ)− V
(pd (q) + p
′
d (q) q − p) = 0 (4.9)
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where we compute the partials of X (ϕ) and M (ϕ) using equations (4.6) and (4.7).
Now, notice that equation (4.8) implies that X (ϕ) − U (ϕ) = β
1−β (M (ϕ) − V ), and
plugging this into equation (4.9) and re-arranging slightly gives
pd (q) + p
′
d (q) q = φ
′(q) (4.10)
This expression says that the quantity produced and imported is pinned down by
equating marginal revenue in the domestic market with marginal production cost in
the foreign country. This is the same restriction we get from a model without search
and therefore implies that adding search does not change the quantity traded. The
profit maximization implied by this equation is crucial: despite being separate entities,
the domestic firm and foreign affiliate decide to set marginal revenue equal to marginal
cost. The result follows because of the simple sharing rule, the maximization of joint
surplus, and the trivial role of the domestic firm. In order to maximize surplus the
parties choose to equate marginal revenue and marginal cost. Later, the result implies
that the productivity threshold needed to export is the same as in a heterogeneous
firm model without search frictions.
4.2.2.3 Import relationship creation
Here we specify the conditions under which unmatched importers are open to
forming new relationship with foreign exporters. Using equation (4.4) together with






M (ϕ) dG (ϕ) (4.11)
This states that the expected cost of being an unmatched importer equals the expected
benefit from importing. Notice that we have removed the maximum over V and M (ϕ)
and simply integrated from the threshold productivity level that satisfies M (ϕ̄) = V .
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We can do this since M(ϕ) turns out to be strictly increasing in ϕ, which we prove
in the appendix. It is worthwhile noting that due to the surplus sharing rule, an
identical productivity threshold could be attained by starting with X (ϕ̄) = U (ϕ̄).
This implies that the productivity cutoffs for exporting and importing are identical.
For a given cost of searching for an export partner, and a distribution of productivities,
this equation pins down the market tightness.3 Notice that as the expected benefit
from importing rises, this equation implies that χ(κ) falls, implying that κ rises,
suggesting more entry into the unmatched importer market. Potential importers
create relationships until the value of being in the unmatched importer market is
driven to zero.
4.2.2.4 Import relationship destruction
Start in equilibrium so that V = 0 and rewrite the surplus sharing rule (4.8) as
βM (ϕ) = (1− β) (X (ϕ)− U (ϕ)) (4.12)
Subtracting equation (4.2) from equation (4.1) gives
r (X (ϕ)− U (ϕ)) = pq − φ (q)− λ (X (ϕ)− U (ϕ))− κχ (κ) (X (ϕ)− U (ϕ))
⇒ X (ϕ)− U (ϕ) = pq − φ (q)
r + λ+ κχ (κ)
(4.13)
Finally, employing (4.7) from above allows us to write the surplus sharing rule as
β
pd (q) q − qp
r + λ
= (1− β) pq − φ (q)
r + λ+ κχ (κ)
(4.14)
Solving (4.14) for p provides the equilibrium import price
3Notice that market tightness, κ, is intrinsically meaningless in this model as discussed in Shimer
(2005). This means that one can either calibrate the cost parameter c and work with the implied κ,
or one can normalize κ and get an implied c.
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where we define the search friction as γ ≡ (r + λ) (1− β)
r + λ+ βκχ (κ)
. In the appendix we show
that γ ∈ [0, 1]. Intuitively, pd (q) has to be the highest price the importer will get
if there are no search frictions, and the average production cost is the lowest price
exporters can get. A price outside of this range would be unsustainable. Furthermore,
we can analyze how the search friction depends on other parameters. As the foreign
exporting firm gets more bargaining power (β → 1), we approach the standard trade
model and γ → 0. In this case, the foreign exporter accrues all the profits from
domestic sales and hence p→ pd(q). Also notice that if κχ(κ)→∞ so that exporting
firms find new domestic partners immediately, which is the case in the standard trade
model, then γ → 0 and p = pd(q).
4.3 Embedding search in a Melitz framework
4.3.1 Consumer preferences
The heterogeneous firm trade model we emulate was first provided by Melitz
(2003) and then extended to allow for asymmetric countries and multiple sectors by
Chaney (2008). There are D possibly asymmetric destination countries indexed by d.
The representative consumer in country d has Cobb-Douglas utility over the goods





where we suppress the country subscript for clarity. The homogeneous good q0 is
freely traded, will serve as numeraire, and has price normalized to one. We assume it
is produced using constant returns to scale where one unit of labor produces wd units
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of the good. In the importing country, the output of each differentiated good sector
qs is an aggregate of Ωs varieties. The aggregator is CES with country and sector











We assume utility has constant returns to scale across sectors so that α0+
∑S
s=1 αs = 1
and require the elasticity across varieties to satisfy σs > 1. For the rest of the paper
we focus on each sector individually; as such, we can suppress the sector subscript
notation.
4.3.2 Production cost function





where wo is the wage in the exporting (origin) country, τdo ≥ 1 is a parameter captur-
ing one plus the iceberg transport cost between the domestic destination d and origin
o, and fdo is the corresponding fixed cost of production for the export market in units





4.3.3 Domestic optimal price
Total income to workers in country d is Yd = wdLd +wdLdπ where wd is the wage,
Ld is labor endowment and π is the dividend per share paid by the global mutual
fund.4 Given these consumer preferences, income and the ideal price index Pd, the
4See Chaney (2008) for details regarding the global mutual fund.
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The price charged in the domestic market is defined by the marginal cost equals
marginal revenue expression (4.10) from above. Given the functional form assump-








. Notice the price charged for the imported good in the domestic
market takes the standard markup over marginal cost form. Using the demand curve











Next we find the productivity threshold that separates foreign exporting from non-
exporting firms. We will find the productivity, ϕ̄, for which X (ϕ̄) − U (ϕ̄) = 0. As
mentioned before, an identical productivity threshold could be attained by starting
with M (ϕ̄)−V = 0. The fact that all matches are mutually beneficial implies that the
minimum productivity with which a domestic importer will be willing to match is the
same as the minimum productivity necessary for a foreign firm to export. Starting
with equation (4.13), setting equal to zero, plugging in for the equilibrium import
price, and the functional forms for demand and domestic optimal price, we derive the














Notice that this productivity threshold pins down the
c
χ(κ)
ratio in equation (4.11).
4.3.5 Productivity distribution
The productivity cumulative density function for each sector is a Pareto distribu-
tion over [1,+∞)
G [ϕ̃ < ϕ] = 1− ϕ−θ
so the probability density function is
g (ϕ) = θϕ−θ−1
and we assume that θ > σ − 1 so that the integral
∫∞
ϕ̄
zσ−1dG (z) is bounded.
4.3.6 The ideal price index














It is important to notice that the ideal price index relies on the price in the domes-
tic market and not the import price negotiated between importers and exporters.
Computing the integral provides the general equilibrium price level (the same as in






























. See the appendix for more details.
4.4 The gravity equation
Comparing the search and trade model to the standard trade model we can see
that the productivity cutoff needed to export is unchanged, the quantity exported
is unchanged, and the price index in the domestic market is unchanged. Most im-
portantly, since the quantity traded and price indexes do not change, welfare in the
model with search will remain the same. The main way search and trade differs from
standard trade is that the price of imported goods is now different. This difference
will change the value of total imports. Before we were counting the value of imports
as pd (q) q but now the value of each variety at the dock is quantity times the import
price from (4.15)
pq = [1− γ] pd (q) q + γφ (q) (4.22)




p (ϕ) q (ϕ) dG (ϕ)
Computing this integral is fairly complicated and we relegate the details to the ap-
















The main message is clear: search frictions reduce total imports to a fraction of their
usual value. Notice that when γ = 0, so search frictions are removed, the usual
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The total value of sales in the domestic economy remains the same as the standard















Total sales in the economy must be equal to the value of all imports plus the period
profit of the importing firms which overcome the search friction
Sdo = Ido + Πdo (4.25)
Using the search adjusted gravity equation in (4.23), total domestic sales in (4.24)
and the accounting identity in (4.25) we can be sure total period profits accruing to














We could also obtain this quantity if we integrate pd (ϕ) q (ϕ) − q (ϕ) p (ϕ) over all
imported varieties.
One important caveat to the gravity equation with search frictions is the extreme
case when κχ (κ) = 0, i.e. the match rate is zero and no matches form. With no
matches occurring in equilibrium no trade takes place. One cannot obtain this result
by sending κχ (κ)→ 0 in the above expression since it is a corner solution. In other
words, at κχ (κ) = 0 the final expression for total imports (4.23) does not apply.
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4.5 Discussion
The fact that introducing search frictions into a model of trade results in a scalar
times the typical gravity equation has a few interesting implications. First, Dear-
dorff’s (1998, p. 12) comment that, “any plausible model of trade would yield some-
thing very like the gravity equation, whose empirical success is therefore not evidence
of anything, but just a fact of life,” once again rings true. In particular, if the search
frictions do not vary by exporter-importer pair so that γdo = γ then their impact
on trade would be lost in the constant term of a gravity regression. In this case,
search frictions could be a pervasive feature of international trade which would not
be identifiable using aggregate data. Using disaggregated data would be the only way
to quantify the importance of these frictions.
Second, if search frictions vary by importer-exporter pair so γdo 6= γ they may
provide an additional rationale for why language, currency, common legal origin,
historical colonial ties or other variables often included in gravity equations have
an effect on aggregate trade flows. In particular, Rauch and Trindale (2002) argue
populations of ethnic Chinese within a country facilitate the flow of information,
provide matching and referral services and otherwise reduce informal barriers to trade.
Interestingly, the authors’ empirical specification matches the gravity equation with
search that we have derived here if γdo was a function of the size of the ethnic Chinese
population.
Lastly, as long as γdo 6= γ any gravity regression that does not include adequate
proxies for search frictions would suffer from omitted variable bias. An analogy to
the labor search literature would suggest a matching function that is Cobb-Douglas
and constant returns to scale in the number of unmatched foreign affiliates and the
number of unmatched importing firms.5 This would mean that the finding rates
5See, for example, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a survey of the matching function in the
context of labor search.
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for the exporters and importers would vary over time with the number of searching
importers. As a result, any gravity regression would suffer from omitted variable
bias unless the researcher included time-varying proxies for the number of unmatched
importers, a very difficult variable to measure.
While the model presented in this paper improves our understanding of steady-
state trade flows and the implications of including search frictions at the aggregate
level, we take the resulting gravity equation from this simple exercise as a sign that
search may be an important feature of trade that requires more research. Given the
strong assumptions needed to derive an expression that would allow study of the
search frictions at the aggregate level, we plan to focus our efforts on firm level data.
We think there are many interesting implications for considering search and trade
in a combined framework. Among these are the demonstrated predictions regarding
aggregate trade, the potential to model international transmission of shocks and a




4.6.1 M(ϕ) increasing in ϕ
Here we show that the value of importing, M(ϕ), is strictly increasing with the
exporter’s productivity level, ϕ. This fact allows us to replace the integral of the max
over V and M(ϕ) (equation 4.4), with the integral of M(ϕ) from the productivity
threshold, ϕ̄ (equation 4.11).
Starting with equation (4.3) and V = 0 obtain
(r + λ)M (ϕ) = pdq − qp
= pdq − [1− γ] pdq − γφ (q)













where we have used the functional form for φ(q), as well as the equilibrium values for



























which is always positive.
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4.6.2 Bounding the search friction
Here we show that γ ∈ [0, 1]. Starting with the definition
γ ≡ (r + λ) (1− β)
r + λ+ βκχ (κ)
Since all parameters are positive, γ ≥ 0. The lower bound,γ = 0, is reached only
when β = 1 and c = 0 simultaneously. Next prove γ ≤ 1 by contradiction. Assuming
γ > 1 implies that 0 > βκχ (κ) which is a contradiction since β ≥ 0 and κχ (κ) ≥ 0.
4.6.3 The ideal price index
The ideal price index in the destination/domestic market will take the same form














The important thing to notice is that the ideal price index relies on the price in
the domestic market and not the import price negotiated between importers and
exporters. Computing the integral will provide the general equilibrium price level
(the same as in Chaney (2008) since the index and threshold are the same).
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This is the same price index as presented in Chaney (2008) page 1713.
4.6.4 The gravity equation




p (ϕ) q (ϕ) dG (ϕ)
We need to integrate over the varieties to get the total value of imports going
into the domestic market. Since q = p−σd
αYd
P 1−σd













so that q = Bϕσ which also implies pd (q) q = µwoτdoBϕ
σ−1 and φ (q) = woτdoBϕ
σ−1+




p (ϕ) q (ϕ) dG (ϕ) = woLo
∞∫
ϕ̄
[1− γ] pd (q) q + γφ (q) dG (ϕ)
The first additive term in the integrand becomes
∞∫
ϕ̄
[1− γ] pd (q) qdG (ϕ) = [1− γ]µwoτdoB
θϕ̄σ−θ−1
θ − σ + 1
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θ − σ + 1
. The second term in the integrand is
∞∫
ϕ̄
γφ (q) dG (ϕ) = γwoτdoB
θϕ̄σ−θ−1






dG (z) = ϕ̄−θ . Combining these provides total exports from country
o to country d as
Ido
woLo
= ([1− γ]µ+ γ)woτdoB
θϕ̄σ−θ−1
θ − σ + 1
+ γfdoϕ̄
−θ
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